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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 930778-CA
Priority No. 2

JOHN B. TENNEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (Supp. 1994).
TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following statutes, rules and
constitutional provisions is contained in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(2) (1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(3) (1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14 (1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a) (1995)
Rule 17 (j), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In an Amended Information dated March 3, 1993, the State

charged Appellant/Defendant John Tenney with thirteen counts of
Selling Unregistered Securities, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-7 (1986) , thirteen counts of Securities Fraud, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1986), one count of acting
as an Unregistered Securities Broker-Dealer or Sale Agent, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (1986) , and two counts of
Employing Unregistered Agents, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-13(2) (1986).

R. 192-197.

A copy of the Amended

Information is contained in Addendum B.
On May 18, 1993 through June 1, 1993, the case was tried
to a jury.

R. 547, 559, 570, 575, 590, 596, 680.

On

June 1,

1993, the jury found Tenney not guilty of counts 3 and 16, and
guilty of all remaining counts.

R. 771-773.

On July 26, 1993,

the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Judge, Third District Court,
sentenced Tenney.

R. 776-7.

A copy of the "Judgment, Sentence

(Commitment)" in this case is contained in Addendum C.
On July 26, 1993, Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial,
which the trial judge denied on October 6, 1993.

R. 778, 809.

Copies of that motion, supporting memorandum and affidavits are
contained in Addendum D.
Following a restitution hearing held on September 6,
1994, the trial court issued its restitution order.

R. 2501-04;

see Addendum E.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Does the improper opening "argument" of the

prosecutor require a new trial where the prosecutor argued,
without supporting evidence, that, among other things, Tenney

2

"deliberately defrauded" over 300 investors of $4,000,000 to
$11,000,000 and that investors were "losing their shirts" while
Tenney was taking their money?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "In reviewing a claim for
prosecutorial misconduct, this court will determine if the
prosecutor's remarks called to the attention of jurors 'matters
they would not be justified in considering in reaching the
verdict, and, if so, whether there is a reasonable likelihood
that the misconduct so prejudiced the jury that there would have
been a more favorable result absent the misconduct.'" State v.
Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v.
Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988)); accord State v. Cummins,
839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897
(Utah 1993) .
2.

Did the trial court commit plain error where it

allowed the State's expert witnesses to testify, among other
things, that certain actions amounted to material omissions or
misrepresentations under the Utah Uniform Securities Act?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The trial court has wide discretion
in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and such
decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard,
[citations omitted]." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah
1993) ("Larsen II"). Plain error occurs where "(i) An error
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful . . . ." State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
3.

Did the trial judge commit reversible error by

improperly instructing the jury as to the elements of the crime,
failing to adequately define terms which were not otherwise selfdefining, and failing to require unanimity as to the elements?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The general rule is that an
accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is
essential. Failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error."
State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985) (citing State v.
Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980).
"The jury must be instructed with respect to all the
legal elements that it must find to convict of the crime charged,
and the absence of such an instruction is reversible error as a

3

matter of law." State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991)
(citing State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980)).
Where an instruction was not objected to at trial, this
Court reviews the issue under a plain error standard. " [T]o
establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate
relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to,
the appellant must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii)
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii)
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict
is undermined." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208.
4.

Did Appellant intelligently, knowingly and

voluntarily waive his right to counsel where the trial judge did
not fully inform him of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[W]hether the trial court applied
the proper legal standard in reaching its decision is a question
of law. State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah App. 1993)
("Bakalov I"). This issue is reviewed under a plain error
standard which requires that an error occurred which was obvious
and prejudicial. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208.
5.

Did the trial judge commit reversible error in

denying Appellant's motion for new trial where a juror spoke
about the case to a friend of Appellant during the course of the
trial and stated a negative opinion about Appellant?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a question of law which is
reviewed under a correction of error standard. However, the
underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).
6.

Did the trial judge commit reversible error in

ordering Appellant to pay $39,000 in restitution to Zieglowsky
where the ascertainment of the amount of damages was a complex
question which should have been litigated civilly?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This court will overturn a trial
court's order of restitution where the "'trial court exceeds the
authority prescribed by law or abuses is discretion.' State v.
Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992) (citations

4

omitted); accord State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 422 (Utah 1987)."
State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 980-81 (Utah App. 1993).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES
POINT 1--Prosecutorial Misconduct in Opening "Argument"
This issue was raised orally and in writing in the trial
court.

R. 1671-74, 579-80.

The improper "argument" can be found

at R. 998-1000; see Addendum F for transcript of challenged
remarks.
POINT II--State's Experts
This issue must be reviewed under a "plain error"
standard of review.

The improper testimony can be found at

R. 1471-74, 1549, 1597-99; see Addendum G for transcript of
testimony.
POINT III--Instructions
The objection to Instructions No. 41 and 42, elements for
"Employing an Unregistered Agent," was raised in the trial court
at R. 3 74-75; see Addendum H.

The remaining issues regarding

improper jury instructions must be reviewed under a plain error
standard.

The improper instructions can be found at R. 681-743;

see Addendum I for a representative instruction of each of the
four types of charges.
POINT IV--Self-representation
Appellant's claim that he did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive his right to counsel must be reviewed under a
plain error standard.

The colloquy by the trial judge is located

at R. 2234-44; see Addendum J.
POINT V--Juror Misconduct
This issue is preserved at R. 778-794.
5

The motion for

new trial, memorandum in support and affidavits are contained in
Addendum D.
POINT VI--Restitution
This issue is preserved at R. 2377-2380.

The transcript

relevant to this issue is contained in Addendum E.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Counts 1 and 14:

Gerald Berg

In about April 1987, Gerald Berg learned from his good
friend, Steve Bowers, about a company which had been put together
to lease phones to rental car agencies.

R. 1119.

Bowers told

Berg that the company was listed on the "pink sheets" "and that
within two weeks it would be coming out."

R. 1120.

Berg subsequently met with Bowers and Kent Jorgensen, who
explained "how great the investment would be and they would take
any risk out by signing an agreement" to guarantee Berg's
investment.

R. 1120, 1121.

Bowers signed such an agreement, and

Berg believed there were no risks because Bowers had signed the
agreement.

R. 112 0, 1121.

Berg could not remember the specifics

of the discussion but testified that he was not told certain
information as part of the transaction or given any financial
statements.

R. 1120, 1122-23.

to the purchase.

Berg never spoke to Tenney prior

R. 113 0.

On April 27, 1987, Berg wrote a check made out to Mobile
Electronics, Inc. to purchase 10,000 shares of Recom for $20,000.
R. 1123.

When Berg did not receive a stock certificate, he

contacted Steve Tycksen, an attorney.

R. 1126-27.

Tycksen and

Berg contacted Tenney, who disavowed the actions of Bowers and

6

Jorgensen, stating that they "had been in trouble prior to this
situation" and Tenney had bailed them out before.

R.

1134-35.

Tenney denied that Bowers was acting as an agent.

R. 1135.

Berg

claimed that Tenney signed an agreement to buy back the stock if
he did not pursue legal action, but Berg was not present when
such agreement was executed.

R. 1135.

Although Tycksen could

not identify Tenney, Tycksen testified that a man claiming to be
Tenney signed the agreement.

R. 13 04, 13 07.

Tycksen testified

that Bowers also signed a buy-back agreement and that he
attempted to get Jorgensen to sign such an agreement, but
Jorgensen refused at the last minute.

R. 13 07.

Tenney testified that he does not recall whether he
entered into such an agreement with Berg.

R. 1908-09.

Berg did

not sign the agreement and the agreement is not dated.

R. 1193.

Counts 2 and 16: Jeffrey Stout
In March or April, 1987, Jeffrey Stout attended a meeting
at which Tenney talked about Cellwest.

R. 113 9.

According to

Stout, Tenney indicated that the price of stock might increase
substantially and that the company would be "going public" in a
couple of weeks.

R. 1140.

Stout received a brochure about

Cellwest but did not receive financial statements or other
information.

R. 1141-42.

Stout wrote a check to Tenney for $3,000 for 1500 shares
on May 26, 1987.

R. 1143.

Other than the meeting, most of the

information Stout received came from Rick Jensen.
Stout received two stock certificates from Jensen.

R. 1148.
R. 1144.

Still later, Jensen gave Stout an agreement dated December
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1987 which indicated that Tenney would buy back the stock within
six months at the price of $5 per share.
Counts 4 and 17:

R. 1146, 1151.

John Cawley

John Cawley is an attorney who got together with Tenney
in about August 1987 after hearing of him from someone who was
selling either insurance or mutual funds.

R. 1155-56.

Tenney

told Cawley that the company was involved in purchasing
telephones and placing them with rental car agencies.

R. 1184.

Cawley could not remember whether Tenney told him exactly what
his connection was with the company.

R. 1159.

Cawley testified

that Tenney told Cawley that the company was going public "in the
foreseeable six months" and that the stock would increase in
value.

R. 1160.

about the company.

Tenney gave Cawley a brochure and pamphlet
R. 1161, 1162.

Cawley knew that any

investment was risky but testified that Tenney did not
specifically state to him that this investment was risky.
R.1163.

Cawley also testified that he was not told a number of

other things about the company.

R. 1164.

A couple weeks after the meeting, Cawley wrote Tenney a
check for $8,000 for 4000 shares of Cellwest stock.

R. 1166.

When Cawley gave Tenney the check, Tenney signed an agreement to
buy back the 4000 shares in six months at $5 a share.
Tenney gave Cawley a stock certificate.

R. 1167.

R. 1169.

In April 1988, Cawley asked Tenney to buy back the stock.
Tenney told him the company had run into problems and there was
no money available to buy back the stock.

Tenney offered,

however, to give Cawley another 4 000 shares if Cawley would keep
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the money invested for the next six months.

R. 116 9-71.

and Cawley entered into an agreement to this effect.

Tenney

R. 1171.

Cawley remembered the Vancouver Exchange being mentioned but did
not know whether other stock exchanges were mentioned.

R. 1174.

Cawley obtained a civil judgment against Tenney in the amount of
$40,000.

R. 1181.

Counts 5 and 18:

Ronald Frost

Ronald Frost first met Tenney in the fall of 1987.
R. 1200.

At the initial meeting, Tenney discussed a company

which he intended to soon take public.

R. 1201.

Tenney did not

mention which stock exchange he hoped to list Cellwest on but did
indicate that he anticipated that the price of the stock would
increase substantially.

R. 1203.

When Frost purchased the stock, he and Tenney entered
into an agreement whereby Tenney agreed to buy back the stock in
six months at $5 per share.

R. 1203.

Frost was given a brochure

on Cellwest but did not receive certain other information about
the company.

R. 12 04, 12 05.

Frost purchased Cellwest stock with a check made payable
to Tenney for $10,000.

R. 1206.

Frost received a stock

certificate for 4000 shares in November 1987.

R. 1210.

He

received another certificate for 4000 shares in June 1988.
R. 1210.
Counts 6 and 19:

David Ingraham

In October 1987, David Ingraham's neighbor brought Tenney
to Ingraham's house so that Ingraham could look at some possible
investments.

R. 1222.

Tenney had some stock options which he
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was offering at $2.50 per share with a buy-back agreement in six
months at $5 per share.

R. 1224. Tenney told Ingraham that the

company would be involved with cellular phones and that they
hoped that the cellular phones would be used in a lot of places.
Ingraham could not recall whether Tenney told him anything about
whether the company would be going public but remembered
something about the London stock exchange.

R. 1226, 1227. He

also received some literature about the company.

R. 1227.

Ingraham's wife wrote Tenney a check dated October 7,
1987 for $2,500 for the purchase of 1000 shares of Cell west
stock.

R. 1227. He received a certificate for 1000 shares of

stock in November 1987. R. 1228.

Ingraham was not given

specific information about the company or its operating history.
R. 1229.
Counts 7 and 20: Kristv and Phillip Holmes
Kristy Holmes heard about Cellwest from Jensen in October
1987.

R. 1236.

Jensen told Holmes that Cellwest provided

cellular phones to car rental agencies.

R. 1236.

He also told

her that she could buy stock at $2 per share, but that the price
was going up by the end of the year because the stock was going
public.

R. 1236.

Jensen told her that the price would double or

triple and that Tenney would sign a letter agreeing to buy back
the stock in six months at $5 per share.

Holmes testified that

she was not told a number of things, including the risks of the
investment, the operating history of Cellwest, any competition
the company had, restrictions on the stock, or how the proceeds
from the sale of stock would be used.
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R. 1238.

Based on her relationship with Jensen, Holmes purchased
250 shares of Cellwest stock with a check for $500 dated October
19, 1987, made payable to Jensen.

R. 1239-40, 1245.

Holmes also

received an agreement letter dated December 31, 1987 to buy back
the stock which Jensen said Tenney would sign.

R. 1240.

Tenney

testified that he did not offer to buy back the Holmes' stock.
R. 1919.
Holmes asked Tenney to buy back the stock in June 1988.
Tenney told her that he was not willing to buy back the stock at
that time and to call back in two weeks.
back several times until April 1989.

R. 1241.

R. 1241.

She called

Holmes filed a

small claims action, but the small claims judge ruled against
her.

R. 1241.

Counts 8 and 21:

Dale and Shirley Panting

On January 15, 1988, Mr. and Mrs. Panting met with
Tenney.

R. 1254.

Tenney told Panting that Cellwest was great

stock and that Panting would double his money in six months.
R. 1255.

Apparently, there was some discussion about the stock

going public in the future.

R. 1256-57.

Panting received a

package of information which included the Confidential Offering
Memorandum of Emerald Entertainment.

R. 1256-57.

Panting

testified that he did not receive specific information about
Cellwest's operating history.

Tenney told him that he had some

trouble with the federal securities laws.

R. 1268.

Dale Panting purchased 2000 shares of Cellwest with a
check for $5,000 dated January 14, 1988 and made payable to
Cellwest.

R.1259; Exhibit 76.

Mrs. Panting also purchased some
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shares of Cellwest.

R. 1259.

Tenney entered into agreements to

buy back the stock from the Pantings.

R. 1261.

Panting made the

investment because Panting's good friend, Craig Peterson, talked
him into it.

R. 1262.

Counts 9 and 22:

Jeffrey Ulibarri

Jeff's brother, Rocky, and Rick Jensen told Jeff about
Cellwest in about January 1988.

R. 1338.

Jeff was not told that

the stock might go public and no stock exchanges were mentioned.
R. 1339.

The only thing Jensen or Rocky told him was that stock

purchased for $2 per share would be bought back in six months for
$5 per share.

R. 1340.

Jeff gave his money to Richard, who

wrote a check to cover both of their purchases.

R. 1342.

Tenney

testified that he did not offer to buy back the stock of Rocky,
Richard or Jeff Ulibarri and that the signature on their
respective "buyback" agreements was not his.
Counts 10 and 23:

R. 1921.

Richard Ulibarri

Richard Ulibarri learned about Cellwest from his brother,
Rocky, and Jensen in October or November, 1987.

R. 1294.

Rocky

was Richard's source of information; in fact, Richard had never
met Tenney and did not speak to Jensen about purchasing Cellwest
stock.

R. 1294.

Rocky told Richard that Cellwest was a company

that would install cellular phones in rental cars and that they
had an option to buy stock in the company before that happened.
R. 12 95.

Rocky also told him that with a buy-back agreement, it

was pretty much guaranteed because after a three-month period,
you got your money back if you wanted to.
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R. 1295.

Richard was not told anything about the stock going
public and no stock exchanges were mentioned.

R. 1295.

He did

not receive other information about the company, brochures or
business plans.

R. 1296.

After Rocky told Richard about Cellwest, Richard and Jeff
decided to invest.

R 1297.

Rocky wrote out a check to Jensen

for $4,000 to cover the purchase of 2000 shares by Rocky and
Jeff.

R. 1297A.

Rocky gave Richard a buy-back agreement about a

week after Richard purchased the stock.

R. 1299.

Tenney

testified that he did not offer to buy back their stock and
disputed the signature on the agreement.

R. 1921.

Richard

called Cellwest several times about getting his money back but
did not think he ever talked to Tenney.
his money back.

R. 1299.

Rocky did get

R. 13 00.

Counts 11 and 24:

Rocky Ulibarri

Rocky learned about Cellwest from Rick Jensen in November
or December, 1987.

R. 1311.

Jensen told Rocky that Cellwest was

a new company which dealt with cellular phones and had some
contracts with car rental companies.

R. 1312.

Jensen told Rocky

that the company was going public in about six weeks.

R. 1312.

Jensen did not give Rocky any brochures or specific financial
information about the company but did tell him that if he
purchased shares at $2 per share, there was a guaranteed buy-back
at $5 per share.

R. 1312, 1313-14.

Rocky purchased 500 shares

of Cellwest with a check dated January 22, 1988 and made out to
Jensen for $1,000.
contact with Tenney.

R. 1315.

Up to this point, Rocky had no

R. 1317.

Rocky received his money
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back after his wife contacted Tenney.

R. 1322.

Although Rocky's

wife testified that she met Tenney at the Cellwest offices, she
was unable to identify him in the courtroom.
Counts 12 and 25:

R. 1333-34.

James Zieglowsky

Jensen introduced Zieglowsky to Tenney in December 1987.
R. 1358-59.

Tenney told Zieglowsky that he was in the process of

setting up a public offering for a cellular phone company of
which Tenney was president.

R. 1360.

Tenney indicated the

company would be listed on various stock exchanges.

R. 1362.

Either Jensen or Tenney told Zieglowsky that for stock purchased
at $2 per share there was a guaranteed buy-back in 90 days at $5
per share.

R. 1362.

Zieglowsky was given a business plan and

various other information.

R. 1363.

In about January 1988, Zieglowsky purchased shares of
Cellwest by trading the equity in three real estate parcels.
R. 1365-66.

The three pieces of property were two apartment

complexes in Ogden and a property in Mountain Green.

R. 1367.

The Zieglowsky agreement required that the stock he purchased was
to be issued to his children and Jensen.

R. 13 73.

Zieglowsky told his stockbroker to sell the stock on the
181st day after purchase and to sell even if the stock was only
listed at $3 per share.

R. 1373.

Cellwest was not listed, and

Zieglowsky's attempts to get Tenney to buy back the stock at $5
per share failed.

R. 1373-75.

Zieglowsky ultimately received

tracts one and three back.
Counts 13 and 26:

Marlene Peterson

Marlene Peterson met Tenney in July 1988.
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R. 2105.

Tenney told Peterson that Cellwest was "coming out" in two weeks
and would significantly increase in value by December.
2111.

R. 2110,

Tenney gave her some information about problems with the

owners of Cellwest and his problems with the Securities Exchange
Commission.

R. 2113, 2134-35.

He did not give her information

about competition and other things.

R. 2113.

Peterson purchased

$2,000 worth of stock but was not sure how many shares she
purchased.

R. 2415.

Peterson became concerned about her

investment and Tenney agreed to return her investment.
R. 2118-20.
Count 28:

Steven Rick Jensen

Jensen testified that Tenney discussed ReCom with him and
that Jensen himself invested in the stock.

R. 1050-52.

Jensen

claimed that Tenney promised to give him ten percent in stock for
any Cellwest investors he brought in.

R. 1059-60.

Jensen

personally sold stock to a number of people and claims to have
given Tenney cash for the various checks made out to him.
R. 1060-62, 1064.

He cannot remember when or where he gave the

cash to Tenney.
Count 29:

Steven Bowers

Bowers met Tenney in about mid-1986.

R. 1631.

At that

time, they discussed Tenney's interest in acquiring a small
communications company which Bowers "had."

R. 1631.

Shortly

thereafter, Tenney "approached" him about purchasing stock in
ReCom.

R. 1631.

R. 1632.

Bowers then spoke to Berg about ReCom.

Bowers gave a packet on ReCom to Berg and a couple

other people.

R. 1632.
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Bowers testified that at a meeting in about April 1987,
"they says, 'You know, get anybody that you want.
and we are really happy.'"

R. 1636.

This is great,

When asked whether he had

ever entered into an agreement with Tenney about selling ReCom
stock, Bowers responded that he was dealing almost exclusively
with Kent Jorgensen.

R. 163 7.

He then testified that Tenney had

paid him $400 "for some people [Bowers] brought in."

R. 1638.

The State never asked Bowers whether Tenney told him about
bankruptcy or SEC action.
John Tenney
Tenney's theory of the case was in part that Cellwest
Communications was exempt from registration because it merged
into an existing corporation.

As a result, the company was not

subject to the registration requirements of an initial public
offering ("IPO").

R. 1894-95, 1907-1919, 2186.

instructed the jury to this effect.

R. 759.

The trial judge

In addition, no

material omissions or representations were made because the
disclosure requirements for an IPO did not apply, and Tenney
otherwise was not involved in a scheme to defraud.

R. 2186-87.

Furthermore, Tenney disavowed the actions of Jensen and Bowers.
R. 2192-94.
The State's expert, Ms. Krendl, testified that a merger
into a previously registered public company was a legitimate way
for a private company to go public and that disclosure
requirements for an IPO did not apply where such a merger occurs.
R. 1607, 1610-12; see also R. 1482.

Nielson, who was the

assistant director of the State Securities Division, had
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purchased Cellwest stock privately and did not have any reason to
check on whether it was properly registered.

R. 1488-89.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I--PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Prosecutorial misconduct violating Appellant's due
process right to a fair trial occurred in this case where the
State argued in opening that Appellant deliberately defrauded 333
investors of $4,000,000 to $11,000,000 but presented evidence
regarding only 14 investors, presented no evidence that Appellant
received that amount of money, and repeatedly acknowledged that
receipt by Tenney of purchase money was not required for any of
the crimes charged.

Utah case law does not require "bad faith"

in order to reverse a conviction based on improper remarks by the
prosecutors.

Even if "bad faith" were required, "bad faith"

occurred in this case where the State made no attempt to
establish that other investors were defrauded, made only a weak
attempt to introduce a clearly inadmissible shareholder list, and
acknowledged that receipt of purchase money is not required.

The

improper opening remarks were prejudicial in that they permeated
the entire proceedings, leaving the impression that Appellant was
involved in a much larger fraudulent operation.
POINT II--STATE'S EXPERTS
The trial court committed reversible error in allowing
the State's witnesses to testify that certain actions were
material omissions or misrepresentations under the Utah Uniform
Securities Act ("the Act"), and other legal conclusions under the
Act.

The testimony went beyond the limits set in State v.
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Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1992), affirmed, 865 P.2d 1355
(1993).
POINT III--INSTRUCTIONS
The trial judge gave the jury several improper
instructions.

The errors in those instructions include:

(a) no

requirement in the "Employing an Unregistered Agent" instruction
that the jury find that Tenney employed the individual "as an
agent," (b) an improper definition of "agent" under the Act, (c)
failure to define the term "authorized" for the jury, (d) failure
to require unanimity as to the act the jury found Tenney
committed as to each count, (e) failure to define "device, scheme
or artifice to defraud," and (f) failure to properly define the
elements of "Unregistered Securities Broker or Agent."

Although

Appellant objected to some of the instructions, others were plain
error since the error should have been obvious to the trial judge
based on statutes and/or case law, and the errors were
prejudicial.
POINT IV--SELF-REPRESENTATION
The record fails to establish that Appellant knowingly
waived his right to counsel.

The trial judge did not adequately

inform Appellant during the waiver colloquy of the procedure to
be utilized during Appellant's testimony or the dangers and risks
of self-representation.
POINT V--NEW TRIAL MOTION
The trial court abused its discretion in denying
Appellant's motion for new trial based on juror misconduct where,
prior to submission of the case to the jury, a juror spoke about
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the case and expressed a negative opinion about Tenney to someone
not involved in the case.

This Court should apply a presumption

of prejudice when misconduct of this nature occurs.

Even without

application of such a presumption, however, a new trial is
required under the circumstances of this case.
POINT VI--RESTITUTION
The complex issues regarding the amount of restitution
owed Zieglowsky, which included a question of whether Zieglowsky
was at fault in allowing the two properties to go into
foreclosure and an accurate calculation of the amount of damages
sustained by Zieglowsky, "are best left to civil litigation."
See State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d at 983.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRES
A NEW TRIAL.
In its opening statement after greeting the jurors, the
State immediately committed prosecutorial misconduct by making
inflammatory and prejudicial statements which it did not later
support with evidence.

The State suggested that 333 people had

been deliberately defrauded by Tenney. R. 998.

The prosecutor

also suggested that Tenney made millions of dollars by defrauding
investors even though the State was well aware that receipt of
the money was not required to prove the criminal charges and
objected successfully to Tenney's attempts to show that he had
not received proceeds, e.g. R. 998, 1010-11, 1906, 1910.
The prosecutor began her opening statement by arguing:
This is a case about innocent, hard-working people who
got taken in a securities scam. They got taken by a
smooth-talking salesman who sold them stock that wasn't
19

worth the paper it was written on. The defendant, John
Tenney, deliberately defrauded dozens of decent people,
333 people, mostly citizens of Utah, bought Cellwest
stock for somewhere between 4 million and $11 million.
While Tenney was collecting all of that money, investors
were losing their shirts.
R. 998 (emphasis added).

In addition, the State improperly

outlined victim impact evidence, claiming that James Zieglowsky
"lost nearly everything he had" and "Jim's children didn't have a
college fund" as the result of Tenney's actions.

R. 1000.

Appellant made an oral and written motion for mistrial
based on the prosecutor's opening statement.

R. 1671-74.

State did not argue that no misconduct occurred.
argued that any misconduct was not prejudicial.

The

Instead, it
R. 1675-76.

The

trial judge denied Appellant's motion, ruling in part that the
prosecutor did not call to the jury's attention matters not in
evidence because the prosecutor thought she would be able to get
the list of alleged shareholders in as evidence.

R. 1679.x

The

judge also concluded that it was "highly unlikely" that the
opening statement was prejudicial.

R. 1680.

The trial judge's conclusion that the prosecutor did not
commit misconduct in opening was incorrect.

Prosecutorial

misconduct occurs where the prosecutor's questions or remarks
"called to the jury's attention matters which they would not be

1

During sentencing, the State acknowledged that the list
was not certified. R. 2322. The comments by the State during
sentencing suggest that the State was aware that the "list was
not self-authenticating and that it did not have a witness to
otherwise authenticate the list." R. 2322. Authentication is a
basic requirement for admissibility. See Utah R. Evid. 901.
Hence, the State apparently knew at the time it made its opening
statement that the list was not admissible.
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justified in considering in reaching their verdict."

State v.

Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 892 P.2d
13 (Utah 1995) .
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed prosecutorial
misconduct in opening statement in several cases.

See e.g. State

v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450 (Utah 1982); State v. Laffertv, 749
P.2d 1239,

1254-55 (Utah 1988); State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483,

485-86 (Utah 1984); State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285 (Utah 1941).
The purpose of an opening statement is to apprise the
jury of what counsel intends to prove in his own case in
chief by way of providing the jury an overview of, and
general familiarity with, the facts the party intends to
prove. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285
(1941). It is generally accepted that an opening
statement should not be argumentative.
Williams, 656 P.2d at 452; see also State v. Erwin, 120 P.2d 285
(during opening, the prosecutor "should not make a statement of
any facts which he cannot legally prove upon the trial").

The

Erwin court held that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to
"recite conversations which were hearsay and incompetent as
evidence" and that "it was improper for him to overstate the
conversations which were admissible in evidence."

Erwin, 120

P.2d at 313.
Some courts consider prosecutorial misconduct which
occurs in opening statement more egregious than prosecutorial
misconduct in closing because the prosecutor had an opportunity
to plan the opening statement, delivered the opening statement in
a less charged atmosphere than closing, and the statement set the
tone for the entire proceeding.

See e.g. United States v.

Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259, 1263 (8th Cir. 1985); State v.
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Echevarria, 860 P.2d 420 (Wash. App. 1993).
In Johnson, the court stated:
We are troubled by the prosecutor's conduct. That the
comment was made during opening statement makes it more
egregious than a similar remark would be during closing
argument. In [United States v.1 Lee [,743 F.2d 1322,
1330 (8th Cir. 1984)], it was noted that certain
improprieties during closing argument may be excused as
the product of provocation by defense counsel. 743 F.2d
at 1253. An opening statement, however, does not unfold
in such a charged atmosphere. We presume that the
opening statement in a case as complex as this was
carefully planned.
Johnson, 767 F.2d at 1275 (emphasis added).
In Echevarria, the Court held that the prosecutor's
remarks during opening were so egregious that they deprived the
defendant of a fair trial.

His remarks "set the tone for the

entire trial" and could not be cured by a cautionary instruction.
Echevarria, 860 P.2d at 422.

The Court stated:

"Argument and inflammatory remarks have no place in the
opening statement." State v. Kroll, 87 Wash.2d 829, 835,
558 P.2d 173 (1976). Appeals to the jury's passion and
prejudice are improper. State v. Claflin, 3 8 Wash. App.
847, 850, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984), review den'd, 103 Wash.2d
1014 (1985). It is the prosecutor's duty to "seek a
verdict free of prejudice and based on reason." State v.
Huson, 73 Wash.2d 660, 663, 440 P.2d 192 (1968), cert,
den'd, 393 U.S. 1096, 89 S.Ct. 886, 21 L.Ed.2d 787
(1969) . The prosecutor's duty to act impartially derives
from his or her position as a quasi-judicial officer.
State v. Kroll, supra 87 Wash.2d at 835, 558 P.2d 173.
Echevarria, 860 P.2d at 422; see also State v. West, 617 P. 2d
1298, 1300 (Mont. 1980) (prosecutor's opening statement regarding
hearsay evidence later ruled inadmissible was reversible error);
United States v. Stahl, 616 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1980)
(reversible error occurred where prosecutor made references to
defendant's wealth and told jury in opening that the case
involved tremendous amounts of money); State v. Kenny, 319 A.2d
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232 (N.J. App. 1974) (reversible error occurred in a case where
although the charge involved a single act of corruption, the
prosecutor stated in opening that the case involved a "story of
corruption" about "the only way you could do business" in the
county); People v. Washington, 204 N.E.2d 25, 29 (111. App. 1965)
(reversible error to indicate that murder victim left wife and
children).
In this case, the first prong of Troy was met where the
State argued the following inflammatory matters which it did not
later prove:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Mr. Tenney deliberately defrauded over 3 00 additional
investors.
Mr. Tenney collected millions of dollars from the
sale of the securities.
Investors "were losing their shirts," i.e. going
broke.
The Zieglowsky children had no college fund after the
transaction with Tenney.
Zieglowsky lost everything.

In addition to being irrelevant and inflammatory
argument, these improper assertions were not supported by the
evidence.

First, the State's only attempt to establish that

Tenney deliberately defrauded over 3 00 people was its feeble and
unsuccessful attempt to introduce an uncertified shareholder
list.

R. 2322.

The shareholder list was not admitted, and even

if it had been, the list itself would not establish that
individuals listed had been defrauded.

R. 1438-40.

In addition,

the State did not establish that Tenney deliberately defrauded
anyone.

Instead, it based its case on the willfulness mental

state required by the Act.

See Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1358-60.
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Nor did the State prove that Tenney received proceeds
from $4,000,000 to $11,000,000 from the sales.

The State

recognized that receipt of proceeds was not an element of the
charges and repeatedly objected when Tenney attempted to
establish that he had not received proceeds from certain sales,
e.g. R. 1010-1011, 1906, 1910.
The State also did not establish that any investors "lost
their shirts" or went broke as the result of the Cellwest
purchase.

In addition, although Zieglowsky testified that the

Cellwest stock was earmarked for his children's education2, there
is no evidence that the children did not have other funds
available for college.

R. 1373.

Finally, there is no evidence that Zieglowsky lost
everything as the result of his purchase of Cellwest stock.

Two

of the three parcels of real estate which he transferred to
Tenney to pay for the stock were ultimately returned to
Zieglowsky.

R. 1384-88.

He continued to deal with Tenney,

bringing him a number of properties which included a ski resort,
Canyon Racquet Club and two apartment buildings.

R. 187-88.

A review of the evidence and opening statement
establishes that the prosecutor made inflammatory and irrelevant
argument and discussed matters not established by the evidence.
The trial judge's incorrect conclusion that the prosecutor's
statement was not misconduct was improperly based on the judge's

2

This victim impact evidence was irrelevant and
inflammatory. Although Tenney, a pro se defendant, did not know
to object, both the trial judge and the prosecutor should have
limited this inflammatory testimony. See Utah R. Evid. 402, 403.
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determination that the prosecutor thought she would be able to
introduce the shareholders list.

This ruling was essentially a

determination that the prosecutor did not act in bad faith rather
than a determination as to whether the opening statement was
improper.
While case law from the Utah Supreme Court does not
clearly define whether bad faith is required for reversal based
on improper argument in opening, the most recent Utah Supreme
Court decision to discuss prosecutorial misconduct in opening did
not require bad faith.

See State v. Troy, 688 P.2d at 487.

Since the Utah Supreme Court did not require bad faith in Troy,
the controlling precedent for this Court requires only that the
prosecutor argued improperly in his or her opening statement, and
that such argument prejudiced the defendant.

See Troy, 688 P.2d

at 4873; Erwin, 120 P.2d at 313.
In addition, the better rule appears to be that
misconduct need not be intentional or in bad faith to require
reversal.

See People v. Bolton, 589 P.2d 396, 398 (Cal. 1978).

In Bolton, the court pointed out that harm caused the defendant
by improper opening remarks "'is nonetheless an injury because it
was committed inadvertently rather than intentionally.'

3

In dictum in State v. Williams, 656 P.2d at 452, a
decision issued prior to Troy, the Supreme Court suggested that
bad faith might be required for a reversal based on prosecutorial
misconduct in opening. The Supreme Court refused to address the
issue of whether bad faith is required for reversal based on
improper opening remarks in a footnote in State v. Lafferty, 74 9
P.2d at 1255 n.13. Given the decision in Troy which reversed the
conviction based in part on prosecutorial misconduct in opening
without requiring bad faith, this Court should review the issue
under the two-prong Troy test and not create an additional bad
faith requirement.
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[citations omitted]."

Bolton, 589 P.2d at 398.

In other words,

a defendant's right to a fair trial is impinged upon by improper
remarks regardless of whether the prosecutor made the remarks in
bad faith.
Even if bad faith were required, the circumstances of
this case demonstrate that the requirement was met.

The only

attempt the State made to establish that additional shareholders
existed was its attempt to introduce an uncertified and
unauthenticated shareholders list.

R. 2322.

Basic knowledge of

the rules of evidence would indicate that this list was
irrelevant, highly prejudicial, and inadmissible due to the lack
of authentication.

Hence, the prosecutor should have known that

it would be difficult if not impossible to admit this list.

In

addition, the prosecutor apparently knew that the State did not
have a witness to authenticate the list.

R. 2322.

See State v.

Kenny, 319 A. 2d at 241 ("A prosecutor may in his opening state
only the facts he intends in good faith to prove by competent
evidence."); Mitchell v. State, 245 So.2d 834 (Ala. 1971)

("for

the prosecutor to lay claim to that which he cannot prove, either
by reason of fact or legal inadmissibility, calls into question
his good faith in making the statement"); Licklitter v.
Commonwealth, 60 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Ky. App. 1933) ("There is no
occasion and no excuse for attempting to influence the jury in
advance by improper statements as to evidence which counsel knows
he cannot prove or will not be permitted to introduce.").
Furthermore, even if the State had been successful in
admitting this list, it was nevertheless improper to argue the
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scheme of defrauding those hundreds of other investors where the
State did not plan to introduce evidence that the others were
defrauded and such evidence would be plainly irrelevant and
prejudicial.
argument.

The State went beyond all reasonable bounds in this

It set the tone for the entire case by setting up

Tenney as an individual who had gotten rich while defrauding
hundreds of people for millions of dollars, and supplementing
that claim with a tale of inadmissible victim impact evidence.
This opening statement improperly appealed to the jury's emotions
and suggested that it should convict Tenney based on this bigger
scheme and not based on the evidence regarding the thirteen
alleged victims in this case.

The obvious impropriety of this

argument and its egregious and inflammatory nature demonstrate
any required bad faith.

See Kenny, 319 A.2d at 241 (prosecutor

acted in bad faith requiring reversal where he argued in opening
that jury would hear a story of corruption about the way business
was done in the county).
Finally, for prosecutorial misconduct to require
reversal, it must be harmful.
(Utah 1992).

State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785

The test for "harmfulness" is whether there is a

reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the jury would have
reached a different result or a probability that the jurors were
influenced by the remarks.

Emmett, 83 9 P.2d at 784-85; State v.

Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991).

The legal basis for a

prosecutorial misconduct claim is that the misconduct deprives a
defendant of his federal right to due process and to confront
witnesses against him.

See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1254;
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Troy, 688 P.2d at 486.
In Troy, the Utah Supreme Court held that the
prosecutorial misconduct required a new trial because the proof
of defendant's guilt of the arson charge was not compelling and
"[t]he jurors 'probably were influenced by' the remarks of the
prosecutor."

Id. at 487.

The Court concluded that "[w]hile the

trial court properly attempted to correct the errors, the
potential for harm, the probability for harm, and the continued
efforts of the prosecutor were too flagrant to be corrected."
Id.
Other courts have found prejudice where the prosecutor's
improper comments have set the tone for the entire trial or
suggest a larger criminal operation than that which is charged in
the case before the jury.

See e.g. Echevarria, 860 P.2d at 421-

22 (prosecutor's comments regarding the war on drugs were
flagrant and highly prejudicial); Kenny, 319 A.2d at 241
(prosecutor's references to corruption and the way business was
done in the country prejudicial because defendant "might well
have been convicted because he was a part of the allegation of
widespread corruption of Hudson County"); People v. Reimann, 42
N.Y.S.2d 599 (1943) (prejudicial error occurred where prosecutor
"injected into the case at the outset the claim that the
defendant was German and a Nazi sympathizer"); Edwards v. State,
212 P.2d 150, 152 (Okla App. 1949) (prejudicial error occurred
where prosecutor argued in opening that the defendant was well
known liquor dealer).
In Erwin, 120 P.2d at 313, the Utah Supreme Court held
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that the prosecutor's misconduct in opening was not reversible
error because the statements related to minor details in the
chain of evidence.

By contrast, in the present case, the

statements regarding a large scheme in which over three hundred
investors were deliberately defrauded set the tone for the entire
case and permeated the trial.
The trial judge recognized the prejudicial effect of
admitting a list of names of people alleged to have invested in
Cellwest.

He stated that the extensive list of names and listed

dollar amounts totaling millions of dollars would create "a high
likelihood that [the jury] may use this particular list and
construe that these were also victims of fraud."

R. 1439.

The

State took the opening argument a step further than the list by
arguing that the other individuals were victims of fraud and that
Tenney pocketed millions of dollars.

See R. 998.

There can be little doubt as to what the prosecutor was
"trying to convey to the jury and little doubt that they picked
it up."

See West, 617 P.2d at 1300.

In this case where the

prosecutor made prejudicial improper remarks during opening which
she knew or should have known would not be supported by the
evidence and where those remarks set the tone for the entire
trial, suggesting that Appellant was involved in a fraudulent
operation which was much larger than the thirteen transactions
charged, a new trial is required.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN ALLOWING THE STATED EXPERT WITNESSES
TO TESTIFY THAT CERTAIN ACTIONS VIOLATED THE
UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT.
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The trial judge qualified two attorneys to testify for
the State as experts "in federal and state securities matters."
R. 1542.

Cathy Krendl, a Colorado attorney, testified during the

State's case in chief.

R. 1538-1616.4

She went beyond the

limits of expert testimony articulated in State v. Larsen, 828
P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1992), affirmed 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993)
("Larsen I"), and testified that certain information was material
under the Utah Uniform Securities Act and failure to disclose
certain material would be a material omission or misstatement
under the Act.

R. 15 97-99.5

She also improperly gave her legal

conclusion that the buy-back agreements were securities under the
Utah Act.

R. 154 9.

Steve Nielsen, assistant director of the State Division
of Securities, testified during the State's case in chief and
rebuttal.

The State listed a number of examples and Nielsen

testified that each would be material.

R. 1471-74.

While this

type of questioning may arguably be permissible under Larsen, the
State took the questioning a step further and asked:
Q: Mr. Nielsen, you have just listed several categories
of information that you view as material under Utah
Securities Law. Would the failure to disclose such
information be a material omission under Utah law?
A:

In my opinion, it would be.

R. 1474 (emphasis added).

Nielsen also testified that the

4

Much of Krendl's testimony was based on her review of
an inadmissible shareholder list which showed out-of-state
investors. R. 1566.
5

Ms. Krendl also testified that the material given to
investors did not meet disclosure requirements under the Act.
R. 1601-02.
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Cellwest Business Plan did not meet disclosure requirements under
the Act (R. 1475) and predictions and financial statements did
not comply with Utah law.

R. 1476-77.

Rules 702 and 704, Utah Rules of Evidence govern expert
testimony.

While Rule 704 allows expert testimony regarding

ultimate issues of fact, it does not permit an expert to give
legal conclusions which "tell the jury what result to reach."
Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App. 1991), cert.
denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).

In Davidson v. Prince, this

Court stated:
"The Advisory Committee notes make it clear that
questions which would merely allow the witness to tell
the jury what result to reach are not permitted. Nor is
the rule intended to allow a witness to give legal
conclusions." Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236,
24 0 (5th Cir. 1983). Thus, an expert generally cannot
give an opinion as to whether an individual was
"negligent" because such an opinion would require a legal
conclusion. See e.g. Shahid v. City of Detroit, 889 F.2d
1543 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that expert testimony was
not admissible on ultimate legal conclusion of whether
correctional officers were negligent in failing to
provide necessary medical treatment to inmate); see also
Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 808-09 (10th Cir. 1988)
(holding that allowing legal expert to testify as to
whether there had been a "search" in plaintiff's
residence constituted reversible error; summarizing cases
in which second, fourth, fifth and sixth circuits held
that expert witnesses may not give legal conclusions);
Hogan v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 812 F.2d 409 (8th Cir.
1987) ("Opinion testimony is not helpful to the
factfinder if it is couched as a legal conclusion.");
Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 814 F.2d 1481, 1485
(10th Cir. 1987) (upholding trial court's exclusion of
expert's opinion as to whether defendant's actions were
"prudent mine practices" on grounds that question called
for a legal conclusion).
Davidson, 813 P.2d at 1231.
In Larsen I, 828 P.2d at 492-93, this Court considered
whether "expert opinion testimony concerning the 'materiality' of
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information not disclosed to investors" was "improper legal
testimony" or simply factual testimony supporting an element of
the crime of securities fraud.

Larsen I, 828 P.2d at 492-3.

This Court recognized that although under Rule 704, "expert
opinion is 'not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact,'" such expert opinion
nevertheless should not include legal conclusions.

Id. at 493.

This Court pointed out:
The danger of allowing expert opinion couched as a legal
standard is that "the jurors will turn to the expert,
rather than to the judge, for guidance on the applicable
law."
3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger,
Weinstein's Evidence, § 704 [02] . See also First Sec.
Bank v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Utah
1989) (legal duty owed by trustee to trustor is question
of law to be determined by the court, and not question of
fact suitable for testimony by expert in real estate
law); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987)
(attorney's expert opinion as to effect of joint tenant's
conveyance was inadmissible statement of law).
Larsen I, 828 P.2d at 493.
In reaching its decision in Larsen I, this Court relied
on the decision in United States v. Leuben, 812 F.2d 179, 183
(5th Cir. 1987), modified, 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1987) 6 , which
"underscored" "[t]he distinction between a factual evidentiary
showing of materiality and impermissible opinion on the legal
question of materiality."

Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493.

This Court

pointed out:
In Leuben, the Fifth Circuit held that expert opinion on
materiality was admissible as being fact-oriented. The
court reasoned that whether certain false statements

6

In United States v. Leuben, 816 F.2d 1032, 1033 (5th
Cir. 1987), the court modified its prior decision and vacated the
portions of the decision which were relied on by this Court in
Larsen I.
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would have had "the capacity to influence" a loan officer
as a factual element of the government's case was
distinguishable from the questions of whether the
statements were legally "material."
Larsen I, 828 P.2d at 493.

This Court held that the testimony as

to "materiality" in Larsen I was factual testimony in support of
an element and did not cross the line into improper legal
conclusion.

Larsen I, 828 P.2d at 493.

On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that
the expert witness "was expressing his opinion that some of the
material that Larsen had omitted from the securities documents
could have been important or significant to an investor.10"
Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1361.

The Court emphasized, however, that

the expert witness "did not, as Larsen suggests, testify that
Larsen was guilty, nor did the [expert witness] testify that, as
a matter of law, the facts established the legal standard of
materiality."

Id. at 1361 fn.10.

Because the testimony in Larsen I and Larsen II related
to a factual issue rather than a legal conclusion, the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the testimony in
that case.

See also Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359

(4th Cir. 1986) (emphasizing the need to draw the line "between
proper expert evidence as to facts, the inferences to be drawn
from those facts, and the opinions of the expert [as to those
facts], on the one hand, and testimony as to the meaning and
applicability of the appropriate law, on the other hand").
By contrast, in United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140
(2d Cir. 1988), the court held that error occurred where a
securities expert "drew directly upon the language of the statute
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and accompanying regulations concerning 'manipulation' and
'fraud'11 and testified for the government that in his opinion,
the defendants were "active participants" in a scheme to
manipulate the stock or defraud.

Scop, 846 F.2d at 140.

The

"use of statutory and regulatory language indicating guilt"
demonstrated that the expert testimony in Scop crossed the line
into inadmissible legal conclusion.

Id. at 142.

The Scop court

distinguished acceptable opinion testimony from unacceptable as
follows:
For example, telling the jury that a defendant acted as a
"steerer" or participated in a narcotics transaction
differs from opining that the defendant "possessed
narcotics, to wit, heroin with intent to sell," or aided
and abetted the possession of heroin with intent to
sell," the functional equivalent of Whitten's testimony
in a drug case. It is precisely this distinction,
between ultimate factual conclusions that are dispositive
of particular issues if believed, e.g. medical causation,
and "inadequately explored legal criteria," that is drawn
by the Advisory Committee's Note."
Scop, 846 F.2d at 142; see also Torres v. County of Oakland, 758
F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1985) (opinion given in language tracking
statute is an improper legal conclusion); Owen v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 239 (5th Cir. 1983) (Rule 704 does not allow
witness to tell the jury what conclusion to reach or give legal
conclusions).
In the present case, the two expert witnesses, at the
prompting of the prosecutor, went beyond giving factual testimony
in support of an element.

Indeed, rather than simply stating

certain information would be significant to investors, the
witnesses opined that certain information or the failure to
supply certain information would be a material misrepresentation
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or omission under the Act.

R. 1597-99, 1771-74.

Furthermore,

rather than outlining disclosure requirements for the jury, both
witnesses instructed the jury that certain documents did not meet
disclosure requirements under the Act.

R. 1601-02, 1475-77.

In

addition, rather than defining a security for the jury and
letting it decide whether Tenney offered or sold unregistered
securities, Ms. Krendl gave her legal conclusion that the buyback agreement was a security.

R. 1549.7

Although Tenney did not object to the improper testimony,
plain error occurred where the trial judge allowed the witnesses
to testify as to whether the State established the elements of
the crime.
Davidson.

This error was obvious under Larsen I, Larsen II and
It was prejudicial in that the expert witness

instructed the jury that certain elements were established.
The improper expert opinion requires reversal of all of
the convictions in this case.

The expert witnesses directed the

jury as to the material omission or misrepresentation element of
the thirteen counts of Securities Fraud.

The direction that the

buy-back agreement was a security affected all other counts.
POINT III. THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIMES.
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF
EMPLOYING AN UNREGISTERED AGENT (COUNTS 28 AND
29) REQUIRES REVERSAL OF THOSE COUNTS.

7

Ms. Krendl's legal conclusion that the buy-back
agreement was security under Utah law confused the issues for the
jury. Pursuant to the version of § 61-1-14 (i) (1986) in effect
at the time of the transactions in this case, the buy-back
agreements were arguably exempt from registration assuming they
were securities.
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Instructions No. 41 and 42 outline the elements for
Counts 28 and 2 9 which charged Tenney with Employing an
Unregistered Agent, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3(2)
(1993).

The instructions list those elements as:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, in the State
of Utah, John B. Tenney, a broker-dealer or issuer;
Willfully;
Employed [Bowers or Jensen];
To offer or sell any security;
To [individuals];
When [Bowers or Jensen] was not licensed as an agent
with the Utah Division of Securities.

Instruction No. 45 defines agent. It states in relevant
part
You are instructed that the term "agent", for purposes Of
Utah's securities laws, means any individual other than a
broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of
securities.
R. 746.

See Instructions 41, 42 and 45 in Addendum K.
These instructions failed to adequately outline the

elements of "Employing an Unregistered Agent" as they are set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3.

The elements instructions for

"Employing an Unregistered Agent" require only that Tenney
"employed" the individual and not that he employed Bowers or
Jensen as an "agent" as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(2).
The language of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 clearly states that "[i]t
is unlawful for any broker-dealer or issuer to employ or engage
an agent unless the agent is licensed."

By failing to include

the "as an agent" language, the trial court failed to set forth
an essential element of the crime of "Employing an Unregistered
Agent."
While at first blush, a distinction between the term
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"employ" and "employ as an agent" might appear unimportant,
further review of the instructions demonstrates that because the
instructions did not require the jury to find that Tenney
employed Jensen or Bowers as an agent, it did not require them to
look to Instruction No. 45 for definition of the term "agent."
Hence, the jury could have found a violation of "Employing an
Unregistered Agent" without finding that Bowers or Jensen acted
as an agent as defined by the Utah Uniform Securities Act.
Instruction 44 (R. 744-45) defines "employ" as "to engage
one's service, hire, or use as an agent or substitute in
transacting business, or to utilize or make use of."

The

multiple definitions given for the term "employ" demonstrate that
the jury was not required to find that Tenney employed Bowers or
Jensen "as an agent" even though "use as an agent" was one of
several alternative meanings for the term "employ."

In other

words, based on the instructions, the jury could have defined
"employed" as "hired" to sell a security even though Bowers or
Jensen did not fit within the definition of "agent" contained in
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(2).
Tenney raised this argument in the trial court by
requesting that the trial judge instruct the jury that he
employed Bowers or Jensen "as his agent."

R.374, 375.

The State

resisted the argument even though Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 plainly
requires that a defendant "employ or engage an agent" to be
guilty of employing an unregistered agent.

See R. 668.

Furthermore, even if the jury did look to Instruction
No. 45 for the definition of "agent," that instruction did not
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accurately define the term "agent" under the Act.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 61-1-13(2) defines "agent" as follows:
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a
broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of
securities.
"Agent" does not include an individual who
represents an issuer, who receives no commission or other
remuneration, directly or indirectly, for attempting to
effect purchases or sales of securities in this state,
and who:
(a) effects transactions in securities exempted by
Subsection 61-1-14 (1) (a), (b), (c), (i), or (j);
(b) effects transactions exempted by Subsection 61-114(2) , or;
(c) effects transactions with existing employees,
partners, officers, or directors of the issuer. A
partner, officer, or director of a broker-dealer or
issuer, or a person occupying a similar status or
performing similar functions, is an agent only if he
otherwise comes within this definition.
While Instruction No. 45 contains the first sentence of
this statute, it does not contain the exceptions which follow.
At least two of these exceptions or areas which the term "agent"
does not cover are arguably applicable in this case, as
demonstrated by the other instructions and the evidence.

Tenney

claimed an exemption in this case based on 61-1-14(1) (i) (1986)
and 61-1-14 (2) (n),

(q), (k) and others.

R. 757.

Hence, the

failure to completely define the term "agent" or outline the
elements of Employing an Unregistered Agent requires reversal of
Counts 28 and 29.
Although Tenney did not object to Instruction No. 45, use
of this erroneous instruction to define the term "agent" under
the Act requires reversal of Counts 28 and 2 9 under a plain error
analysis.

Pursuant to Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209, a three-prong test

is applicable to determining whether erroneous jury instructions
require reversal under a plain error approach.
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That three-prong

test requires a determination of whether (1) the instruction was
erroneous; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial
judge; and (3) the error was prejudicial.

In Dunn, the Court

held that the erroneous jury instruction required reversal
because the Court could "not be sure that the jury did not
convict Dunn on the basis of reckless mental state alone."

Dunn,

850 P.2d at 1209; see also Roberts, 711 P.2d at 239 ("general
rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of
an offense is essential"); Jones, 823 P.2d at 1061 ("absence of
[instruction on all legal elements of a crime] is reversible
error as a matter of law"); Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 663
(Wyo. 1993) (plain or fundamental error occurs where trial court
fails to properly instruct the jury on an element of the crime);
Chambers v. People, 682 P.2d 1173, 1179 (Colo. 1984) (failure to
properly instruct jury as to all elements of crime is plain
error); State v. Brokus, 858 S.W.2d 298, 302-03 (Mo. App. E.D.
1993) (plain error not to include definition of "serious physical
injury" and to require exposure to physical injury rather than
serious physical injury); United States v. Prieto-Teias, 779 F.2d
1098 (5th Cir. 1986) (plain error occurred where trial court
failed to instruct jury as to meaning of "unlawfully").
All three of the considerations outlined in Dunn for
finding plain error in instructing the jury are present in this
case.

First, as set forth supra at 37-8, the instructions did

not adequately define the term "agent."

Second, the error should

have been obvious to the trial judge because Instruction No. 45
based its definition on the statute but omitted the necessary

39

exclusions as stated in the definition statute.

See Dunn, 850

P.2d at 1209 (error should have been obvious to trial judge from
a review of applicable statutes).

Third, the error was

prejudicial because the jury could have convicted Tenney of
"Employing Unregistered Agents" without making a finding that
Tenney employed Bowers or Jensen "as an agent" as required and
defined by the Act.

See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 ("error was

prejudicial because [the Court] cannot be sure that the jury did
not convict Dunn on the basis of a reckless mental state alone").
B. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY
INSTRUCT THE JURORS AS TO ANY CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTABLE TO TENNEY FOR THE
ACTIONS OF OTHER PERSONS.
Other than the incomplete definition of the term "agent"
contained in Instruction No. 45, Instruction No. 52 is the only
instruction outlining for the jury the law regarding Tenney7s
legal responsibility for the actions of Bowers, Jensen and
others.

See Addendum L for copy of Instruction No. 52.

Instruction No. 52 informed the jury that Tenney was responsible
for the actions of any agents or "authorized salesman" whose
statements Tenney "authorized" without giving the jury any
definition of the term "authorized."

The use of the term

"authorized" incorporated the law of agency whereas the term
"agent" apparently referred to "agent" under the Act, as
incorrectly defined in Instruction No. 45.
Despite the complex nature of the law of agency and the
multiple meanings of the term "authorized" in the context of
agency law, the trial judge did not include an instruction
defining that term for the jury.
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Under general principles of

agency law, an agent is "authorized" to act on behalf of a
principal pursuant to either actual or apparent authority.

See

Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090,
1094-95 (Utah 1988).
Actual authority incorporates the concepts of express
and implied authority. Express authority exists whenever
the principal directly states that its agent has the
authority to perform a particular act on the principal's
behalf. Implied authority, on the other hand, embraces
authority to do those acts which are incidental to, or
are necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or
perform, the main authority expressly delegated to the
agent. Implied authority is actual authority based upon
the premise that whenever the performance of certain
business is confided to an agent, such authority carries
with it by implication authority to do collateral acts
which are the natural and ordinary incidents of the main
act or business authorized. This authority may be
implied from the words and conduct of the parties and the
facts and circumstances attending the transaction in
question, [footnotes omitted].
In comparison, an agent's apparent or ostensible
authority flows only from the acts and conduct of the
principal.
Clark Clinic Corp, 762 P.2d at 1094-95.
In Clark Clinic Corp., the Supreme Court further
explained apparent authority by quoting its previous decision in
City Elec. v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah
1983) .
Where corporate liability is sought for acts of its agent
under apparent authority, liability is premised upon the
corporation's knowledge of and acquiescence in the
conduct of its agent which has led third parties to rely
on the agent's actions. Nor is the authority of the
agent "apparent" merely because it looks so to the person
with whom he deals. It is the principal who must cause
third parties to believe that the agent is clothed with
apparent authority . . . It follows that one who deals
exclusively with an agent has the responsibility to
ascertain that agent's authority despite the agent's
representations. [footnote omitted].
Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d at 1095, quoting City Elec., 672
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P.2d at 90 (emphasis added).

Hence, apparent authority must be

established by the acts of the principal and not the acts of the
agent.

Id.
Although the complex nature of agency law has spawned

numerous cases and an extensive discussion in Restatement
(Second) of Agency, the trial judge failed to define the term
"authorized" or to otherwise guide the jury in determining
whether Tenney was legally responsible for the actions of others.
Failure to adequately define the term "authorized"
requires that Counts 1-26 be reversed since this Court "cannot be
sure that the jury did not convict" Tenney based on the actions
of others which did not amount to "authorized" activity under
law.

At the very least, the charges based on the transactions

with Berg (Counts 1 and 14), Kristy and Phillip Holmes (Counts 7
and 20) , Jeffrey Ulibarri (Counts 9 and 22), Richard Ulibarri
(Counts 10 and 23), and Rocky Ulibarri (Counts 11 and 24),
require a reversal since the jury was required to rely on an
agency theory in order to convict Tenney.

Indeed, none of these

individuals spoke to Tenney prior to the purchase of stock.

R.

1130, 1135, 1294, 1317, 1238-40, 1338-40.
Failure to define for the jury significant terms which
are necessary to its determination on the elements is plain
error.

See Brokus, 858 S.W.2d at 302-03; Prieto-Teias, 779 F.2d

at 1105; discussion regarding plain error in jury instructions
supra at 38-9.

The jury was given no guidance as to how to

determine whether Bowers, Jensen or others were "authorized" to
act on behalf of Tenney.

This error in failing to define for the
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jury a significant and essential term which was not self-defining
should have been obvious to the trial judge given the complex
nature of agency law and the extensive discussions in cases
regarding the term "authorized."

It is impossible to determine

whether the jury's verdicts on Counts 1-26 were predicated on a
correct understanding of what an authorized salesman is.
Reversal of those counts is therefore required.
C. THE INSTRUCTIONS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY GUIDE
THE JURY REGARDING THE THIRTEEN COUNTS OF
SECURITIES FRAUD.
1. The Instructions Failed to Require Unanimity
as to the Act the Jury Believed Tennev Committed.
Instructions No. 27 through 3 9 outlined the elements for
securities fraud involving thirteen different purchasers.
R. 713-748.

Those instructions differed only in terms of the

names of the individual purchasers and outlined the elements of
securities fraud as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

At sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, in the
State of Utah, John B. Tenney, directly or
indirectly;
In connection with the offer or sale of any security;
To [alleged purchaser];
Willfully;
Either
a ) . employed a device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, OR
b ) . made an untrue statement of a material fact or
omitted to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, OR
c ) . engaged in an act, practice, or course of
business which operated or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person.

R. 713-48; see Addendum I.
The instructions outline three possible alternative acts
required for the crime of securities fraud and do not require
43

unanimity as to a specific act.

The elements instructions

themselves suggest that the jury need only unanimously agree that
one of the alternative acts was committed and not that the jurors
agree as to which act.

None of the other instructions require

unanimity as to the act, and Instruction No. 48 confuses the
issue by suggesting that "[e] ach count may have a different or
the same misrepresentation or omission."

R. 749; see

Addendum M.8
As this Court recognized in State v. Saunders, 259 Utah
Adv. Rep. 24 (UtahApp. 1995),
There can be no question that jury unanimity is necessary
as to all elements of a crime. See Utah Const, art. I,
§10; Utah R. Crim. P. 2 K b ) ; Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d
211, 216 (Utah 1993), cert, denied,
U.S.
, 114
S.Ct. 706 (1994); State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 25758 (Utah 1988) .
Id. at 25.
The only question then is whether in the context of this
pro se case, it was plain error for the trial judge to fail to
instruct the jury that it was required to reach a unanimous
decision as to the act committed by Tenney.
In Saunders, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26, this Court applied
the three-part Dunn test for determining whether the failure to
require unanimity was plain error.
test supra at 38-9.

See discussion regarding Dunn

Rather than analyzing each prong of the Dunn

8

Instruction No. 65 is the only instruction which refers
to unanimity. That instruction states in part that "it requires
a unanimous agreement of all the jurors to find a verdict." See
Addendum M for copy of Instruction No. 65. This instruction
discusses the "verdict" as the jury's decision as to all counts
and suggests that the jury need only be unanimous as to guilt or
innocence and not that it be unanimous as to the basis for
finding each element.
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test, this Court analyzed the requirement that the error should
have been obvious to the trial court.

This Court held that the

failure to require unanimity was not plain error in Saunders
since the defendant stated that the issue was one of first
impression in Utah and Utah Supreme Court case law on unanimity
did not provide a uniform rule which could be extended to the
case.

Saunders, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26.
In determining that case law did not establish a uniform

rule as to unanimity, this Court in Saunders cited State v.
Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 163-68, 169-71, 175-78 (Utah 1978), and
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 562-68, 577-80, 585-88 (Utah
1987) ("Tillman I"). A review of Tillman I and Russell, however,
demonstrates that unanimity as to the act committed by the
defendant was required under Utah law prior to the decision in
Saunders.
In Russell, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether
unanimity as to mens rea under the second degree murder statute
was required.

In holding that unanimity as to mental state for

second degree murder is not required, the Russell court made it
clear that "[t]here are limitations on the rule" and explicitly
suggested that one such limitation is that "the jury must
unanimously agree on the actus reus element of the offense
[where] the prohibited acts fell into two conceptually distinct
categories."

Russell, 733 P.2d at 167.

This Court also indicated in Saunders, 259 Utah Adv. Rep.
at 26, that Tillman I was evidence of the "Utah Supreme Court's
struggle in dealing with unanimity problems" and cited Tillman I
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as "indicating division of views among justices as to whether
jury must unanimously agree on specific aggravating circumstance
necessary to support first degree murder conviction."
259 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26.

Saunders,

Although the justices did express

differing views in Tillman I as to whether unanimity is required
as to aggravating circumstances in a capital homicide case, a
majority of the justices agreed that such unanimity is required.
See Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 567, 590-91.9

In addition, a majority

reached the issue even though it was not raised in the trial
court.

Id.
Any confusion which arguably may have existed as to the

requirement that there be a unanimous verdict as to the act
committed by the defendant was clarified in Tillman II, 855 P.2d
211 which was issued after judgment was entered against Kirk
Saunders but shortly before the trial in
the present case.

Hence, the obviousness analysis in this case

differs from that in Saunders and necessarily requires a review
of the clarifying discussion in Tillman II.
In Tillman II, all of the justices indicated that in
Tillman I, a majority of the Court had agreed that jury unanimity
as to aggravating circumstances is required.

9

Tillman II, 855

Justices Durham and Zimmerman determined in Tillman I
that unanimity as to aggravating circumstances was required and
the instruction was "inadequate to inform the jury of its
obligation to decide unanimously regarding the charged arson and
burglary." Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 588. They would have reversed
the conviction based on the absence of a unanimous verdict as to
the aggravating circumstances. Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 590-91.
Justice Stewart agreed that unanimity was required but determined
that the jury had been adequately instructed as to that
requirement. Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 567.
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P.2d at 216, 223-24, 226-27.

The lead opinion in Tillman II

states:
. . . Notwithstanding federal law, the Utah constitution
does require jury unanimity on all elements of a crime.
On direct appeal, a majority of this court held that
jurors are constitutionally required to agree unanimously
on each element of a criminal offense, including at least
one aggravating circumstance in a capital offense.
[footnote omitted].
Tillman II, 855 P.2d at 216 (emphasis added).

The remaining

justices in their concurring and dissenting opinions agreed that
jury unanimity was required as to all elements.
P.2d at 222, 223, 226.

Tillman II, 855

Hence, Tillman II, which was issued less

than two months before the trial in the present case began,
established that jury unanimity is required for all elements of a
crime.

Tillman II, 855 P.2d at 216.
Other jurisdictions have held that the failure to give a

unanimity instruction is plain error where some of the jurors may
have convicted the defendant based on different actions than
those found by the rest of the jurors.

See e.g. United States v.

Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1986) . Where confusion as
to the basis of the conviction exists, it is plain error for the
judge to fail to instruct the jury that unanimity is required.
Id.; see also United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 463 (3rd Cir.
1987) (where government prosecutes under multiple theories,
reversible error occurs where "there is a significant possibility
that [the] error may have resulted in a non-unanimous verdict in
violation of the sixth amendment11); United States v. Gipson, 553
F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant's sixth amendment right to
unanimous verdict violated where instructions authorize
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conviction based on one of several alternative acts); Covington
v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 440 (Alaska App. 1985) ("Where one jury
instruction may encompass two separate incidents, the trial judge
must instruct the jury that . . . the jurors must be unanimous as
to the incident or incidents of which they find the defendant
guilty.").
Under the three-prong Dunn analysis, plain error occurred
in failing to adequately instruct the jury that it must reach a
unanimous verdict as to the act which constituted the crime of
securities fraud.

First, pursuant to Tillman II and Saunders,

the failure to require a unanimous verdict was error.

Second,

the error should have been obvious to the trial judge in light of
the clearly articulated unanimity requirement in Tillman II and
other case law.

Finally, the error was prejudicial since there

is no assurance that the jury reached a constitutionally required
unanimous verdict as to the act committed by Tenney to sustain
each count of securities fraud.
2. The Instructions Failed to Adequately Define
"Device, Scheme or Artifice to Defraud" for the
Jury.
An additional error occurred in regard to the securities
fraud instructions based on the trial court's failure to define
the term "employed a device, scheme or artifice to defraud" which
is one of the three alternative acts listed in Instructions 27
through 39.

R. 713-24.

In Scop, 846 F.2d at 140, the court

pointed out that under the federal statute, "'manipulation,'
'scheme to defraud' and 'fraud' are not self-defining terms but
rather have been the subject of diverse judicial
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interpretations."
The trial judge has the obligation to adequately guide
the jury by instructing it as to the elements of the crime and
the definition of any legal concepts that are not self-defining.
See Prieto-Teias, 779 F.2d at 698; Brokus, 858 S.W.2d at 302-03.
Although the Act lists these terms under § 61-1-1
(securities fraud), it does not include definitions for the
terms.

Nor is there Utah case law defining the term "device,

scheme or artifice to defraud."
The lack of case law or statutory guidance does not,
however, free the trial judge from his obligation to adequately
instruct the jury regarding the meaning of this term.

In State

v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1137 (Utah 1992), decided before the
trial in this case, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the trial
court's ruling that the failure of the Act to define specific
terms used in the Act violated due process because the Act
"failed to advise a reasonable person of the nature of the
securities transactions which may not be effected without
registration as an agent with sufficient clarity . . . ."

Id.

Although the Swenson court did not reach the vagueness issue, the
decision in Swenson informed trial judges of potential due
process concerns where the Act does not define a term which is
not otherwise self-defining and raised the issue of instructing
juries regarding complex terms contained in the Act.
The three-prong Dunn test for reversibility is met in
this case.

First, it was error to not instruct the jury on a

legal concept which was not self-defining.
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Second, that error

should have been obvious in light of Swenson, Jones and
a review of the Act.

Finally, the error is prejudicial because

we cannot be sure that the jury did not convict Appellant based
on an improper definition of the term "device, scheme or artifice
to defraud."
D. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF "UNREGISTERED
SECURITIES BROKER OR AGENT."
Instruction No. 40 listed the elements of "Unregistered
Securities Broker or Sales Agent" as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

Sometime subsequent to April 27, 1987, John B.
Tenney;
Transacted business in the State of Utah as a brokerdealer or agent by;
Willfully;
Offering or selling any security;
To any one of the following individuals: Gerald
Berg, Jeffrey Stout, David Baker, John Cawley, Ronald
Frost, David Ingraham, Kristy and Phillip Holmes,
Dale and Shirley Panting, Jeffrey Ulibarri, Richard
Ulibarri, Rocky Ulibarri, James Zieglowsky, or
Marlene Peterson;
When John B. Tenney was not registered as a brokerdealer or agent with the Utah Division of Security;
"broker-dealer," for purposes of Utah's securities
laws, means any person engaged in the business of
effecting transactions in securities for the account
of others or for his own account.

R. 746.
As set forth supra at 37-8, Instruction No. 45 improperly
defines the term "agent" under the Act.

The first sentence of

the definition contained in § 61-1-13(2) is contained in
Instruction No. 45.

However, Instruction No. 45 does not contain

the statutory exceptions.
The instructions also do not adequately define "brokerdealer."

Instruction No. 45 contains the first sentence of the

definition found in Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(3) but does not
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contain the exclusions outlined in the statutory definition.
Because the instruction fails to adequately define
"agent" or "broker-dealer," the conviction on Count 27,
"Unregistered Securities Broker or Sale Agent," should be
reversed.

See Brokus, 858 S.W.2d at 302-03; discussion supra at

37-8 regarding plain error in failing to adequately instruct
jury.

The instructions are erroneous in that they do not contain

a complete definition of "agent."

This error should have been

obvious to the trial judge since the statute contains the
complete definition.

The error is prejudicial since the jury

could have found that Tenney fit within the statutory exclusion
for the term "agent" or "broker-dealer."

This Court cannot be

sure that the jury convicted Tenney based on a correct definition
of these terms.

See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209.

E. THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT IT
MUST REACH A UNANIMOUS VERDICT AS TO EACH
ELEMENT REQUIRES REVERSAL OF ALL COUNTS.
As set forth supra at 44-8, the jury must unanimously
find each element of the crime in order to convict a defendant.
See Saunders, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25; Tillman I, 750 P.2d at
567, 590-91; Tillman II, 855 P.2d at 216, 223-24, 226-27.

The

trial judge failed to instruct the jury that unanimity as to each
element was required.

Indeed, the only instruction pertaining to

unanimity informed the jury that it must reach a unanimous
verdict.

R. 766.

This requires only that the jury agree that

Tenney was guilty of something and not that they reach a
unanimous verdict as to which act he committed.
Failure to instruct the jury as to the requirements that
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they reach a unanimous verdict as to each element was an error
which should have been obvious to the trial judge in light of
Saunders, Tillman I and Tillman II; see discussion supra at 44-8.
This error was harmful and prejudiced all counts as follows.
First, there is no assurance that the jury reached the
constitutionally mandated unanimous verdict on the securities
fraud counts since they were presented with three alternative
acts from which to choose as a basis for each of those counts;
see discussion supra at 43-48.

In addition, on the counts

involving Bowers or Jensen, there is no assurance that the jury
reached unanimity as to Tenney's responsibility based on an
"agency" theory or his own actions.
Second, the State presented alternative theories to
support the "Selling Unregistered Securities" counts and the
"Employing an Unregistered Agent" counts.

The State apparently

claimed that the initial sale of stock as well as the issuance of
buy-back agreements involved the offer or sale of securities.
See R. 1549.

There is no assurance that some of the jurors did

not convict Tenney on these counts based on the determination
that the buy-back agreements were unregistered securities while
others convicted him based on the initial sale of stock.

If the

jury clumped these two alleged acts together and determined that
Tenney sold an unregistered security at one point or another, the
constitutionally mandated unanimous verdict was not reached on
the unregistered securities counts.
In addition, in counts where the State presented evidence
of actions by Bowers or Jensen, there is no assurance the jury
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reached a unanimous verdict based on an "agency" theory versus
direct acts by Tenney.

Similarly, some members of the jury may

have determined that Jensen and Bowers were agents when they
offered the buy-back agreements whereas others may have decided
they acted as agents in the initial sale of stock.

There is no

assurance under the circumstances of this case that the jury
reached a unanimous verdict as to act on the unregistered
securities counts or the Employing Unregistered Agents counts.
The "Unregistered Securities Broker or Sales Agent"
instruction presents a similar problem in that it allowed the
jury to convict Tenney if it found he was a "broker-dealer" or
"agent."

Since no instruction required the jury to find

unanimously that he was one or the other, there is no assurance
that the jury reached a unanimous decision on that element.

They

may well have reached a unanimous "verdict" as required by
Instruction No. 65 that he was either a broker-dealer or agent
but disagreed as to which role he played.
The trial judge's failure to instruct the jury that it
was required to reach a unanimous verdict as to each element of
each count was plain error.

See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209.

POINT IV. APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WERE VIOLATED WHERE THE
RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT HE VOLUNTARILY
AND KNOWINGLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantee an
accused the right to self-representation.

Faretta v. California,

422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Bakalov I,
849 P.2d at 632; State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987);
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State v. Probe1. 815 P.2d 724, 731 (Utah App. 1991).
11

[T] he exercise of the right of self-representation

necessarily constitutes a waiver of the right to counsel [.]"
Bakalov I, 849 P.2d at 633; Probe1, 815 P.2d at 731; Frampton,
737 P.2d at 187.

Because self-representation involves a waiver

of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, "trial courts have an
affirmative duty to see that a defendant who chooses
self-representation does so knowingly and intelligently,
[citations omitted]."
P.2d at 187.

Probe1, 815 P.2d at 731; Frampton, 737

"The decision must also be voluntary."

Bakalov I,

849 P.2d at 633, citing Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187; see also State
v. Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354, 1355 (Utah 1993) ("Bakalov II").
A waiver of the right to counsel is required in part
because "when an accused manages his own defense, he
relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional
benefits associated with the right to counsel."

Schafer v.

State, 459 So.2d 1138, 1139 (Fla. App. 1984).
In order to knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
waive his right to counsel, a defendant "should be made aware of
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the
record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open.'"

Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187.

In

Bakalov I, this Court recognized:
Some courts have held that if the trial court fails to
create an adequate record demonstrating (1) that the
court explored the defendant's capacity to select
self-representation; and (2) a factual basis for finding
defendant did not knowingly and intelligently opt
self-representation, the appropriate remedy is to reverse
and remand for a new trial. Schafer v. State, 459 So.2d
1138, 1139 (Fla. App. 1984); State v. Watkins, 25 Wash.
App. 358, 606 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1980).
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Bakalov I, 849 P.2d at 634-35.
In Bakalov II, 862 P.2d at 1355, the Supreme Court relied
on Judge Greenwood's decision in Bakalov I which pointed out that
"the trial court never advised Dr. Bakalov of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation and thus could not then or
now assess his responses to that advice."

The Supreme Court

directed the trial court "to conduct a colloquy on the record
between the court and Dr. Bakalov to insure that he understands
the risks of self-representation and thereby waives his
constitutional right to assistance of counsel."

Bakalov I, 862

P.2d at 1255.
In Frampton, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that an
on-the-record colloquy between the court and defendant which
includes "penetrating questioning by the trial court" "is the
preferred method of ascertaining the validity of a waiver because
it insures that defendants understand the risks of
self-representation."

The Court included a sample colloquy.

Frampton, 73 7 P.2d at 188 n.12; see Addendum P for copy of
Frampton colloquy.

"While this colloquy is not mandatory, it

provides a helpful framework for the trial courts."

Bakalov I,

849 P.2d at 633, citing Drobel, 815 P.2d at 732.
Although an on-the-record colloquy is the preferred
method for establishing waiver, a waiver can be established in
the absence of such a colloquy by reviewing the record for "any
evidence in the record which shows a defendant's actual awareness
of the risks of proceeding pro se."

Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188.

Circumstances to be considered and which the record must show
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are:

(1) "that the defendant understood the seriousness of the

charges and knew the possible maximum penalty"; (2) that the
defendant was aware of technical rules of evidence and procedure
and that such rules would be applied to him; and (3) that the
defendant was made aware "that presenting a defense was not just
telling a story."

Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188.

The focus is on

whether the defendant understands the ramifications of
self-representation and "what he or she is giving up by choosing
self-representation."

Bakalov I, 849 P.2d at 633. See also

Briscoe v. State, 606 A.2d 103, 108 (Del. Supr. 1992) (listing
guidelines for determining whether defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived right to counsel).
While a defendant's mental health and background are also
relevant in determining whether the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel, the fact that he is
well educated "is not dispositive as to whether he understood the
relative advantages and disadvantages of self-representation in a
particular situation."

Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188.

In the present case, the record does not establish that
Mr. Tenney was made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation so that he was able to knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to counsel.

In particular,

Mr. Tenney was not made aware of the procedure to be utilized
when he testified or that he would be unable to simply tell a
story in presenting his defense.
During the pretrial conference held on March 3, 1993, the
trial judge engaged Mr. Tenney in an on-the-record colloquy
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regarding Tenney's self-representation.

R. 2234-44. A

transcript of that colloquy is contained in Addendum J.

A review

of that colloquy demonstrates that the trial judge questioned Mr.
Tenney regarding his educational background, previous experience
representing himself in a civil case, his belief in his ability
to represent himself, his understanding of the burden of proof in
a criminal case, his understanding that the court would appoint
an attorney to represent him, and the possible penalty and
serious nature of the charges.

R. 2234-44.

The trial judge did not, however, inform Mr. Tenney that
the rules of procedure and evidence would be strictly followed in
his case, that he could not present a defense by telling a story,
that when he testified, he would be required to prepare questions
ahead of time, and that standby counsel would not be permitted to
address objections made by the State, rephrase questions after
the trial court sustained a State's objection, or otherwise
elaborate, inquire further or refine questions when necessary.
The only discussion regarding the rules of evidence and
procedure was as follows:
The Court: One of the concerns the court has, Mr.
Tenney, is that it sounds as if based upon your education
and experience, it would appear to me you certainly have
the ability and capability, in all likelihood, to master
the facts. But one of the concerns I have, Mr. Tenney,
is even though you may have the ability to understand and
master the facts, presenting those facts consistent with
the rules of procedure and rules of evidence is something
very different and something which usually requires not
only that one have the training of legal education, but
also the benefit and experience of practicing in the area
of criminal law to be informed and knowledgeable
regarding the rules of evidence as it relates to criminal
law issues, as well as the rules of criminal procedure.
Those are the kinds of concerns that I have regarding
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your ability to adequately represent yourself. Why is it
you believe vou are going to be able to master those
rules in order to be able to present your defense in this
case?
R. 2235-36 (emphasis added).

Rather than addressing the

technical hurdles involved in the rules of procedure and evidence
in responding to the court's concerns, Appellant focused on his
knowledge of securities law and the fact that he had an
"assistant" who was a lawyer in the Legal Defender's office.
R. 2237.
Tenney's response failed to demonstrate that he was aware
that the technical requirements of the rules of procedure and
evidence would be applied to him and that he would be required to
frame his questions and make his objections within the parameters
of those rules.

Indeed, Tenney's response suggests that he was

under the impression that he would be able to simply tell his
story and that he was the person best equipped to tell that story
because of his securities background.10

R. 2237.

During the course of trial, around the time the State
rested, the trial judge informed Tenney for the first time that
he would not be permitted to testify in narrative form.
24, 1726.

R. 1723-

Instead, the trial judge instructed Tenney to prepare

the questions which he would answer, then give a copy to standby

10

Tenney's response also suggests a fundamental
misunderstanding of the role of standby counsel. Standby counsel
does not act as an "assistant" to a pro se litigant, and a pro se
defendant does not have a "right" to standby counsel. Instead,
standby counsel's role is limited so as not to undermine the
jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself.
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984). A pro se defendant
does not have a right to effective assistance of counsel or
effective assistance of standby counsel. Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46.
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counsel and the judge.

R. 1726-28.

Standby counsel was limited

to reading the questions prepared by Tenney and was not permitted
to elaborate, follow up or reword questions when the trial judge
sustained an objection. E.g. 1726-28; 1768, 1779-80, 1795, 1796,
1806, 1807, 1809, 1813, 1819-20, 1842, 1843, 1846, 1851-52.
In outlining the procedure to be utilized, the trial
judge stated that he wanted to give Tenney some "advance notice"
as to the procedure to be utilized.

This advance notice was too

late and should have been given when Tenney was questioned
regarding his desire to represent himself.

The trial judge's

failure to advise Tenney of dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation as contemplated by Faretta, Frampton,
Bakalov I, and Bakalov II requires a new trial.
"[T]he appointment of standby counsel, for a defendant
who proceeds pro se is not an acceptable alternative to a knowing
and intelligent waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."
Briscoe, 606 A.2d at 109 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938)); United States v. Weltv, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1982);
United States ex. rel. Axselle v. Redman, 624 F.Supp. 332 (D.
Del. 1985); see also Burks v. State, 748 P.2d 1178 (Alaska App.
1988).

In the present case, where standby counsel did not play

an active role and merely advised Tenney off the record, the
appointment of standby counsel did not cure the defective waiver.
See Redman, 624 F.Supp. at 339.
Although Appellant did not raise this claim in the trial
court, reversal and remand for a new trial is nevertheless the
appropriate remedy.

See Bakalov I, 84 9 P.2d at 634-35; Drobel,
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851 P.2d at 731.

In Probe1, this Court explicitly stated that

"trial courts have an affirmative duty to see that a defendant
who chooses self-representation does so knowingly and
voluntarily."

Probe1, 815 P.2d at 731. Bakalov I recognized

that the failure to create a record which demonstrated that the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel
requires reversal and remand for a new trial.
P.2d at 634-35.

Bakalov I, 849

It should have been obvious to the trial judge

that he was required to fully inform Tenney of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation and to otherwise make sure
that Tenney knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his
right to counsel before allowing Tenney to proceed without
counsel.
Furthermore, this is an issue that would evade review if
this Court were to require a precise technical objection in order
to raise a claim that a pro se defendant did not properly waive
his right to counsel.

Pro se defendants who are not trained in

the law and express a desire to represent themselves will rarely,
if ever, know the requirements for self-representation and will
not know the necessity of on-the-record objections unless so
informed.

The trial judge should have the responsibility to

ensure that a pro se defendant properly waives his right to
counsel regardless of whether that defendant requests the proper
procedure.

Tenney was harmed by the error because he proceeded

to trial without knowing the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation and may well have opted to exercise his right to
counsel had he known the limits which would be placed on his
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testimony and the role of standby counsel.11

See Bakalov I, 849

P.2d at 634-35; Bakalov II, 862 P.2d at 1355.
Under these circumstances, the trial judge's failure to
advise Tenney of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation requires a new trial.
POINT V. THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
BASED ON JUROR MISCONDUCT.
Following trial, Appellant filed a motion for new trial
based on juror misconduct.

R. 778. Appellant submitted

affidavits from Richard D. Christensen, D.D.S. and Margaret
Wallace.

R. 791-94; see Addendum D.

The affidavits indicated

that one of the jurors, Dr. Richard L. Barnett, shared an office
with Dr. Christensen.

R. 791-94, 804-06.

On or about May 25,

1993, during the course of the instant trial, Dr. Barnett had a
conversation with Dr. Christensen, during which Dr. Barnett
indicated that the defendant in the case on which he was a juror
was John Tenney, who was charged with securities fraud.
804-05.

R. 791,

Dr. Barnett also told Dr. Christensen that he thought

Christensen was a friend of Tenney's.

R. 791, 804-05.

During the course of the conversation, Dr. Barnett
indicated that Tenney was a "really bad guy."

Dr. Christensen

responded that his experiences with John Tenney had all been
good.

R. 792. Margaret Wallace who worked in the office

11

It should be noted that following the trial, Tenney
requested counsel. Appellate counsel directly represents Tenney
and is not in the role of standby counsel.
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reported the same conversation.

R. 793-94.12

The parties stipulated to the trial judge deciding the
issue based on the motion, memoranda and affidavits.

R. 807.

The trial judge denied Defendant's motion for new trial "for the
reasons set forth in plaintiff's memorandum in opposition
thereof."

R. 809.

The trial judge then signed an order prepared

by the prosecutor which denied the motion for new trial for the
following reasons:
1. The juror, Dr. Richard Barnett, may have
violated rule 17 (j), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by
briefly conversing with another doctor about defendant's
business practices; however, that action does not justify
a mistrial.
2. Dr. Barnett's actions did not indicate that he
had formed an opinion or bias against defendant; neither
was there any indication that the actions would impact on
the juror's deliberation in the case.
"'The right to trial by a fair and impartial jury is^ an
important one which should be scrupulously safeguarded.'"

Logan

City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah App. 1990), quoting
State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1977).

Juror

misconduct requires a new trial under many circumstances.

See

State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992) (juror misconduct in
answering voir dire questions requires new trial); State v.
Swain, 835 P.2d 1009 (Utah App. 1992) (potential prejudice which
arose when juror spoke with victim during recess required new
trial); State v. Ahrens, 479 P.2d 786 (Utah 1971) (juror
misconduct in visiting city offices and talking to employees

12

According to Dr. Barnett's affidavit, he told
Dr. Christensen he could not talk about the case. Nevertheless,
he thereafter stated that "Tenney appeared to be a 'slick
operator'" but that Dr. Barnett did not know yet whether Tenney
had broken any laws. R. 805.

during trial required new trial in embezzlement prosecution
against city recorder); State v Thorne, 117 P. 58 (Utah 1911)
(juror misconduct requires new trial where juror leaves other
jurors during lunch break after submission of the case to make a
telephone call).
Where a juror has contact with parties, their attorneys,
witnesses, or court personnel which "goes beyond mere incidental,
unintended and brief contact," a rebuttable presumption of
prejudice arises.

Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d at 226,

quoting State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985) . Prejudice is
also presumed in other contexts of juror misconduct.

See e.g.

Ahrens, 479 P.2d 786 (prejudice presumed where juror went to city
offices during embezzlement trial); Thorne, 117 P. at 60
(prejudice presumed where juror made telephone call after
submission of case); State v. Miller, 875 P.2d 788, 791-92 (Ariz.
1994) ("Prejudice may be presumed here, because '[i]n a criminal
case, any private communication, contact or tampering, directly
or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter
pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed
presumptively prejudicial . . . ' [citations omitted].").
Various court rules attempt to protect against tainting
jurors through improper contact.

Rule 17 (j), Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure and Rule 47(k), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
require that jurors be admonished that they not converse "on any
subject of the trial" or "form or express an opinion thereon
until the case is finally submitted to them."

Rule 606(b), Utah

Rules of Evidence provides for "[i]nquiry into validity of
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verdict or indictment" where a juror is exposed to extraneous
prejudicial information or "any outside influence was improperly
brought to bear upon any juror."
In Ahrens, 4 79 P.2d at 787-88, the Utah Supreme Court
reversed a criminal conviction where one of the jurors visited
city offices during the second day of a city recorder's trial for
embezzlement.

In support of its decision, the Court stated:

We have no way of determining whether or not the conduct
of the juror influenced his judgment in arriving at a
verdict. We adhere to the rule stated in prior decisions
of the court that the law requires of the juror such
conduct during the time that his verdict may be above
suspicion as to it having been influenced by any conduct
on his part during the trial.
In Thorne, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a conviction
for first degree murder based on a juror's misconduct in placing
a telephone call to an unidentified person after the case was
submitted to the jury.

Although the record did not contain

information as to the person the juror called or the nature of
the communication, the Court applied a presumption of prejudice
and reversed the conviction.

It reasoned that the actions of the

juror were "unauthorized and forbidden" and the State failed to
establish that the communication was harmless.
66-7.

Thorne, 117 P. at

The Court noted:
And generally in cases where it has been held that the
misconduct of a juror engaging in unauthorized
communications with others was not prejudicial, and did
not vitiate the verdict, it was affirmatively and clearly
made to appear what the conversation or communication
was, and that it was entirely harmless, and unrelated to
the case, or, in cases of a separation, that the
circumstances were such that the juror was not, and could
not have been, exposed to prejudicial or harmful
influences by reason of the separation.
Various other Utah decisions have considered whether
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juror misconduct requires a new trial.

In Arellano v. Western

Pacific Railroad Company, 298 P.2d 527 (Utah 1956), the Court
held that a new trial was not required where one of the parties
alleged that a juror conversed with his brother, who was an
attorney, about the case.

The Court determined that the

complaining party had not established that such a conversation
had actually occurred.

The Court further indicated that if such

a conversation had occurred, it would violate Rule 47(k), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under such circumstances, reversal

would be required if the complaining party could establish that
the conversation influenced the jury.

See also Gee v. Smith, 541

P.2d 6 (Utah 1975) (new trial not required where juror
inadvertently shown picture of victim while in the restroom
where photographs of victim were introduced into evidence;
prejudicial effect of inadvertent incident not established under
these circumstances).
In the present case, Juror Barnett had a conversation
about the case in violation of Rule 17(j), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

The affidavits submitted by both parties establish

that the conversation and violation occurred.

The only issue for

this Court, then, is whether the violation was prejudicial.

This

Court must first determine whether a presumption of prejudice
arises based on the misconduct.

Pike, Ahrens and Miller support

a determination by this Court that any time juror misconduct
occurs, such a presumption arises.

Such a presumption is

appropriate given the sanctity of the right to fair trial by
impartial jury and the recognition that it is difficult to
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determine the extent of any impact of the improper contact.
For instance, in the present case, regardless of whether
a presumption is applied, it is apparent that at least one juror
had formed an opinion about Tenney prior to submission of the
case.

The difficulty of changing an opinion once formed and

voiced is reflected in the oft repeated instruction which
cautions jurors not to form or voice an opinion until all of the
evidence is heard.

Furthermore, it is difficult to ascertain in

this case the impact of information that Tenney knew Juror
Barnett's office mate.

Juror Barnett may well have disliked his

office mate or had some ongoing dispute which left him with no
respect for the other dentist.

Knowledge that the other dentist

knew and admired Tenney may well have impacted negatively on
Juror Barnett.
In this case where the rules of criminal procedure were
violated by the exposure of the juror to extraneous information
and the juror may well have been influenced by that exposure, a
new trial is required.
POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN ORDERING APPELLANT TO PAY $3 9,000 IN
RESTITUTION TO ZIEGLOWSKY.
Over Appellant's objection (R. 2375-2380), the trial
judge ordered Appellant to pay $39,000 in restitution to
Zieglowsky.

R. 2503-04; see Addendum E.13

The restitution to

Zieglowsky is the only restitution amount contested by Appellant.
R. 2350.

The State sought restitution to Zieglowsky based on the

13

The Court ordered additional restitution on other
counts totalling $53,950. Appellant stipulated to those amounts.
R. 2365.
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losses arguably sustained by Zieglowsky in connection with two
tracts of land.

R. 2367-75.

The State proffered its testimony regarding the losses
sustained by Zieglowsky.

In regard to the first piece of

property, the State proffered that in 1988, the property was
valued at $75,000, with an indebtedness of $27,000.

R. 2368.

The State further proffered that the first tract was refinanced
and Zieglowsky signed a note for $48,000.

R. 2370.

Of that

amount, $20,000 went to pay off the indebtedness; the remainder
apparently went into Cellwest.

R. 2370.

Zieglowsky collected rents and made payments for one
year.

R. 2371.

The State did not include an accounting of the

amount collected in rent or the amount of the principal paid off
during that one-year period.

The State further proffered that

Zieglowsky "walked away" from the property after that one-year
period and assumed that Tenney would collect rents and make
payments on the property.

R. 2371.

Tenney proffered that he did

not have title or physical possession of the property and
indicated that perhaps Zieglowsky simply "walked away" and was
responsible for any subsequent foreclosure proceedings.

R. 2379.

The State proffered that Zieglowsky subsequently learned
that the bank was foreclosing on the property, and paid $6,000 to
redeem the property.

R. 2371.

The trial judge determined that

Tenney must pay the $6,000 plus the difference between the
$46,700 value of the property in 1988 and the $27,000 lien on the
property at that time.

R. 2372, 2502-03.

The State proffered that the second piece of property was
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valued at $42,800, with an indebtedness of $29,400 when it was
transferred to Tenney.

R. 2368.

"that property was lost."

The State also proffered that

R. 2373.

The trial judge required

Tenney to pay restitution in the amount of $13,400 for that
property.

R. 2373.

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(4) (a) provides in pertinent
part:
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution up to double the amount of
pecuniary damages to the victim or victims of the offense
of which the defendant has been convicted, or to the
victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by the
defendant to the sentencing court.
In Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982, this Court considered the
impact of due process concerns on restitution awards.

This Court

recognized:
"The demands of due process rest on the concept of basic
fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate
to the case and just to the parties involved." Holm v.
Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157, 164 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting
Wiscombe v. Wiscombe, 644 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah App.
1987) (quoting Rupp v. Grantsvilie City, 610 P.2d 338,
341 (Utah 1980). "One of the fundamental requisites of
due process is the opportunity to be fully heard." Id.
(quoting Wiscombe, 744 P.2d at 1025).
The Robinson court analyzed whether restitution is proper
in traffic cases which involve negligence.

The court held that

restitution is not appropriate in such cases because the
defendant is deprived of property without an opportunity to be
fully heard.

Robinson, 982 P.2d at 982.

The court pointed out

that the issues of fault, proximate cause and amount of damages
are a crucial part of civil litigation where a traffic accident
occurs, and that "[m]atters of negligence, proximate cause and
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the amount of resulting damages are best left to civil
litigation."

Robinson, 860 P.2d at 983. The court held that

restitution was improperly awarded in that case which arose from
a "traffic violation that involve[d] only negligence, and not
criminal intent."

Id.

The present case arose from a criminal matter which
involved only "willfulness" and not specific intent to defraud or
sell unregistered securities.

In addition, the amount of damages

which James Zieglowsky sustained involves a complex question
which would be better left to civil litigation.
As can be seen from the proffers, Appellant did not have
an opportunity to be fully heard and the trial judge did not
receive sufficient evidence to accurately calculate the damages
in this case.

No evidence was presented as to the amount

Zieglowsky collected in rents from the first property or the
amount made in payments on that property during the first year
after the property was refinanced.

Any excess rent which may

have existed and gone to Zieglowsky and any decrease in principal
during that year were not taken into account in figuring the
damages sustained by Zieglowsky.
Nor did the judge fully explore the question of whether
Zieglowsky was responsible for either property becoming subject
to foreclosure.

Determining the appropriate amount of damages

in a case such as this would have been better left to civil
litigation.

As was the case in Robinson, Tenney did not have an

opportunity to be fully heard on the matter of restitution to
Zieglowsky.

The trial court erred in ordering that Tenney pay
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$39,000 in restitution to Mr. Zieglowsky.
REASONS FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION
This appeal raises a number of complex issues which
involve areas of the law requiring further development.
Point I addresses, among other things, the issue of
whether improper remarks made by the prosecutor during opening
statement require reversal only if they are made in "bad faith"
and, if so, what constitutes "bad faith."
at 1255 n.13.

See Lafferty, 749 P.2d

Point II raises the issue of whether testimony by

the State's expert witnesses which goes beyond the limits
enunciated in Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1355, requires reversal
under a plain error analysis.

Point III addresses the adequacy

of various elements instructions under to the Uniform Securities
Act and requires this Court to consider the responsibility of the
trial judge to adequately instruct the jury as to all elements
and legal concepts stated in the instructions.
P.2d at 1209.

See Dunn, 850

This issue also raises, among other things, the

question of the circumstances under which the failure to require
jury unanimity as to the act constitutes plain error, and allows
this Court to refine its decision in Saunders, 259 Utah Adv.
Rep. 24.

Point IV raises the issue of what constitutes an

adequate colloquy where a criminal defendant indicates that he
would like to represent himself.

See Bakalov I and Bakalov II.

Point V addresses the issue of prejudice where a juror has
improper contact during the course of a trial.

Point VI raises

an issue as to the appropriateness of restitution where the
ascertainment of the amount of damages involves a complex
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question which would be more fairly litigated in a civil
proceeding, and asks this Court to extend the holding of
Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982, beyond traffic cases.
The number of issues raised, along with their complexity,
require both oral argument and a written opinion.

Because many

of the issues raised ask this Court to refine previous decisions
or further develop specific areas of law, a written opinion and
oral argument are requested.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that all counts be
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

'/

day of July, 1995.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Text ot Statutes, Kules and Constitutional Provisions

61-1-1. Fraud unlawful.
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase
of any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.

61-1-3. Licensing of broker-dealers, agents, and investment advisers.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this state as a
broker-dealer or agent unless the person is licensed under this chapter.
(2) (a) It is unlawful for any broker-dealer or issuer to employ or engage an
agent unless the agent is licensed. The license of an agent is not effective
during any period when he is not associated with a particular brokerdealer licensed under this chapter or a particular issuer.
(b) When an agent begins or terminates a connection with a brokerdealer or issuer, or begins or terminates those activities which make him
an agent, the agent as well as the broker-dealer or issuer shall promptly
notify the division.
(3) It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this state as an
investment adviser or as an investment adviser representative unless:
(a) the person is licensed under this chapter; or
(b) the person's only clients in this state are investment companies as
defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940, other investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, trust companies, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, employee benefit plans with assets of not less
than $1,000,000, and governmental agencies or instrumentalities,
whether acting for themselves or as trustees with investment control, or
other institutional investors as are designated by rule or order of the
director; or
(c) the person has no place of business in this state and during any
period of 12 consecutive months does not direct business communications
in this state in any manner to more than five clients, other than those
specified in Subsection (b), whether or not the person or any of those to
whom the communications are directed is then present in this state.
(4) (a) It is unlawful for any investment adviser required to be licensed to
employ an investment adviser representative unless the investment adviser representative is licensed under this chapter.
(b) The license of an investment adviser representative is effective during the period when the person is employed by an investment adviser
licensed under this chapter.
(c) When an investment adviser representative begins or terminates
employment with an investment adviser, both the investment adviser
and the investment adviser representative shall promptly notify the division.

61-1-7. Registration before sale.
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless
it is registered under this chapter or the security or transaction is exempted
under Section 61-1-14.

61-1-13. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities. "Agent" does not include an individual who
represents an issuer, who receives no commission or other remuneration,
directly or indirectly, for effecting or attempting to effect purchases or
sales of securities in this state, and who:
(a) effects transactions in securities exempted by Subsection
61-l-14(l)(a), (b), (c), (i), or (j);
(b) effects transactions exempted by Subsection 61-1-14(2); or
(c) effects transactions with existing employees, partners, officers,
or directors of the issuer. A partner, officer, or director of a brokerdealer or issuer, or a person occupying a similar status or performing
similar functions, is an agent only if he otherwise comes within this
definition.

61-1-13. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(3) "Broker-dealer" means any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others or for his own
account. "Broker-dealer" does not include:
(a) an agent;
(b) an issuer;
(c) a bank, savings institution, or trust company;
(d) a person who has no place of business in this state if:
(i) the person effects transactions in this state exclusively with
or through:
(A) the issuers of the securities involved in the transactions;
(B) other broker-dealers; or
(C) banks, savings institutions, trust companies, insurance companies, investment companies as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing
trusts, or other financial institutions or institutional buyers,
whether acting for themselves or as trustees; or
(ii) during any period of 12 consecutive months the person
does not direct more than 15 offers to sell or buy into this state in
any manner to persons other than those specified in Subsection
(3)(d)(i), whether or not the offeror or any of the offerees is then
present in this state;
(e) a general partner who organizes and effects transactions in
securities of three or fewer limited partnerships, of which the person
is the general partner, in any period of 12 consecutive months;
(f) a person whose participation in transactions in securities is
confined to those transactions made by or through a broker-dealer
licensed in this state;
(g) a person who is a real estate broker licensed in this state and
who effects transactions in a bond or other evidence of indebtedness
secured by a real or chattel mortgage or deed of trust, or by an agreement for the sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire mortgage,
deed or trust, or agreement, together with all the bonds or other
evidences of indebtedness secured thereby, is offered and sold as a
unit;
(h) a person effecting transactions in commodity contracts or commodity options; or
(i) other persons as the division, by rule or order, may designate,
consistent with the public interest and protection of investors, as not
within the intent of this subsection.

61-1-14. Exemptions.
(1) The following securities are exemptedfromSections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15:
(a) any security, including a revenue obligation, issued or guaranteed
by the United States, any state, any political subdivision of a state, or any
agency or corporate or other instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, or any certificate of deposit for any of the foregoing;
(b) any security issued or guaranteed by Canada, any Canadian province, any political subdivision of any Canadian province, any agency or
corporate or other instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, or any
other foreign government with which the United States currently maintains diplomatic relations, if the security is recognized as a valid obligation by the issuer or guarantor;
(c) any security issued by and representing an interest in or a debt of,
or guaranteed by, any bank organized under the laws of the United
States, or any bank, savings institution, or trust company supervised
under the laws of any state;
(d) any security issued by and representing an interest in or a debt of,
or guaranteed by, any federal savings and loan association, or any building and loan or similar association organized under the laws of any state
and authorized to do business in this state;
(e) any security issued or guaranteed by any federal credit union or
any credit union, industrial loan association, or similar association organized and supervised under the laws of this state;
(f) any security issued or guaranteed by any railroad, other common
carrier, public utility, or holding company which is subject to the jurisdiction of the interstate commerce commission, a registered holding company under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or a subsidiary of such a company within the meaning of that act, or any security
regulated in respect of its rates or in its issuance by a governmental
authority of the United States, any state, Canada, or any Canadian province;

(g) a i l y security listed on the National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotation System, the New York Stock Exchange,
the American Stock Exchange, or on any other stock exchange or medium
approved by the division, except that the director may at any time suspend or revoke this exemption for any particular stock exchange, medium, security, or securities under Subsection 61-1-14(4); any other security of the same issuer which is of senior or substantially equal rank to
any security so listed and approved by the director, any security called for
by subscription rights or warrants so listed or approved, or any warrant
or right to purchase or subscribe to any of the foregoing;
(h) (i) any security issued by any person organized and operated not for
private profit but exclusively for religious, educational, benevolent,
charitable, fraternal, social, athletic, or reformatory purposes, or as a
chamber of commerce or trade or professional association; and
(ii) any security issued by a corporation organized under Title 3,
Chapter 1, and any security issued by a corporation to which the
provisions of that chapter are made applicable by compliance with
the requirements of Section 3-1-21;
(i) a promissory note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance
that evidences an obligation to pay cash within nine months after the
date of issuance, exclusive of days of grace, or a renewal of such an obligation that is likewise limited, or a guarantee of such an obligation or of a
renewal:
(i) issued
(ii) either:
(A) receives a rating in one of the three highest rating categories from a nationally recognized statistical rating organization;
or
(B) the issuer satisfies requirements esLililisInnl in
Ii
order of the division;
(j) any investment contract issued in connection with an employees'
stock purchase, savings, pension, profit-sharing, or similar benefit plan;
(k) a security issued by an issuer registered as an open-end management investment company or unit investment trust under Section. 8 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, if:
(i) (A) the issuer is advised by an investment adviser that is a
depository institution exemptfromregistration under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or that is currently registered as an
investment adviser, and has been registered, or is affiliated with
an adviser that has been registered, as an investment adviser
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 for at least three
years next preceding an offer or sale of a security claimed to be
exempt under this subsection; and
(B) the adviser has acted, or is affiliated with an investment
adviser that has acted as investment adviser to one or more
registered investment companies or unit investment trusts for at
least three years next preceding an offer or sale of a security
claimed to be exempt under this subsection; or
(ii) the issuer has a sponsor that has at all times throughout the
three years before an offer or sale of a security claimed to be exempt
under this subsection sponsored one or more registered investment

companies or unit investment trusts the aggregate total assets of
which have exceeded $100,000,000;
(hi) in addition to Subsection (i) or (ii), the division has received
prior to any sale exempted herein:
(A) a notice of intention to sell which has been executed by the
issuer which sets forth the name and address of the issuer and
the title of the securities to be offered in this state; and
(B) a filing fee as determined under Section 61-1-18.4;
(iv) in the event any offer or sale of a security of an open-end
management investment company is to be made more than 12
months after the date on which the notice and fee under Subsection
(iii) is received by the director, another notice and payment of the
applicable fee shall be required.
(v) For the purpose of this subsection, an investment adviser is
affiliated with another investment adviser if it controls, is controlled
by, or is under common control with the other investment adviser;
(1) any security as to which the director, by rule or order, finds that
registration is not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors.
(2) The following transactions are exempted from Sections 61-1-7 and
61-1-15:
(a) any isolated transaction, whether effected through a broker-dealer
or not;
(b) any nonissuer transaction in an outstanding security, if as provided
by rule of the division:
(i) information about the issuer of the security as required by the
division is currently listed in a securities manual recognized by the
division, and the listing is based upon such information as required
by rule of the division; or
(ii) the security has a fixed maturity or a fixed interest or dividend
provision and there has been no default during the current fiscal year
or within the three preceding fiscal years, or during the existence of
the issuer and any predecessors if less than three years, in the payment of principal, interest, or dividends on the security;
(c) any nonissuer transaction effected by or through a registered broker-dealer pursuant to an unsolicited order or offer to buy;
(d) any transaction between the issuer or other person on whose behalf
the offering is made and an underwriter, or among underwriters;
(e) any transaction in a bond or other evidence of indebtedness secured
by a real or chattel mortgage or deed of trust, or by an agreement for the
sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire mortgage, deed of trust, or
agreement, together with all the bonds or other evidences of indebtedness
secured thereby, is offered and sold as a unit;
(f) any transaction by an executor, administrator, sheriff, marshal, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, guardian, or conservator;
(g) any transaction executed by a bona fide pledgee without any purpose of evading this chapter;
(h) any offer or sale to a bank, savings institution, trust company,
insurance company, investment company as defined in the Investment
Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing trust, or other financial
institution or institutional buyer, or to a broker-dealer, whether the purchaser is acting for itself or in some fiduciary capacity;

(il any offer or sale of a preorganization certificate or subscription if:
(i) no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly
or indirectly for soliciting any prospective subscriber;
(ii) the number of subscribers acquiring any legal or beneficial
interest therein does not exceed ten; and
(iii) there is no general advertising or solicitation in connection
with the offer or sale;
(j) any transaction pursuant to an offer by an issuer of its securities to
its existing securities holders, if;
(i) no commission or other remuneration, other than a standby
commission is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting any
security holders in this state and the transaction constitutes either:
(A) the conversion of convertible securities;
(B) the exercise of nontransferable rights or warrants;
(C) the exercise of transferable rights or warrants if the rights
or warrants are exercisable not more than 90 days after their
issuance; or
(D) the purchase of securities under a preemptive right; and
(ii) the exemption created by Subsection (2)(j) is not available for
an offer or sale of securities to existing securities holders who have
acquired their securities from the issuer in a transaction in violation
of Section 61-1-7;
(k) any offer, but not a sale, of a security for which registration statements have been filed under both this chapter and the Securities Act of
1933 if no stop order or refusal order is in effect and no public proceeding
or examination looking toward such an order is pending;
(1) a distribution of securities as a dividend if the person distributing
the dividend is the issuer of the securities distributed;
(m) any nonissuer transaction effected by or through a registered broker-dealer where the broker-dealer or issuer files with the division, and
the broker-dealer maintains in his records, and makes reasonably available upon request to any person expressing an interest in a proposed
transaction in the security with the broker-dealer information prescribed
by the division under its rules;
(n) any transactions not involving a public offering
(o) any offer or sale of "condominium units" or "time period units" as
those terms are defined in the Condominium Ownership Act, whether or
not to be sold by installment contract, if the provisions of the Condominium Ownership Act, or if the units are located in another state, the condominium act of that state, the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act, the
Utah Timeshare and Camp Resort Act, and the Utah Uniform Consumer
Credit Code are complied with;
(p) any transaction or series of transactions involving a merger, consolidation, reorganization, recapitalization, reclassification, or sale of assets,
if the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is the issuance of
securities of a person or persons, and if:
(i) the transaction or series of transactions is incident to a vote of
the securities holders of each person involved or by written consent or
resolution of some or all of the securities holders of each person involved;
(ii) the vote, consent, or resolution is given under j provision in.

(A) the applicable corporate statute or other controlling statute;
(B) the controlling articles of incorporation, trust indenture,
deed of trust, or partnership agreement; or
(C) the controlling agreement among securities holders;
(iii) (A) one person involved in the transaction is required to file
proxy or informational materials under Section 14(a) or (c) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Section 20 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and has so filed;
(B) one person involved in the transaction is an insurance
company which is exempt from filing under Section 12(g)(2)(G) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and has filed proxy or informational materials with the appropriate regulatory agency or
official of its domiciliary state; or
(C) all persons involved in the transaction are exempt from
filing under Section 12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and file with the division such proxy or informational material as the division requires by rule;
(iv) the proxy or informational material is filed with the division
and distributed to all securities holders entitled to vote in the transaction or series of transactions at least ten working days prior to any
necessary vote by the securities holders or action on any necessary
consent or resolution; and
(v) the division does not, by order, deny or revoke the exemption
within ten working days after filing of the proxy or informational
materials;
(q) any transaction pursuant to an offer to sell securities of an issuer if:
(i) the transaction is part of an issue in which there are not more
than 15 purchasers in this state, other than those designated in Subsection (2)(h), during any 12 consecutive months;
(ii) no general solicitation or general advertising is used in connection with the offer to sell or sale of the securities;
(iii) no commission or other similar compensation is given, directly
or indirectly, to a person other than a broker-dealer or agent licensed
under this chapter, for soliciting a prospective purchaser in this state;
(iv) the seller reasonably believes that all the purchasers in this
state are purchasing for investment;
(v) the transaction is part of an aggregate offering that does not
exceed $500,000, or a greater amount as prescribed by a division rule,
during any 12 consecutive months; and
(vi) the director, as to a security or transaction, or a type of security or transaction, may withdraw or further condition this exemption or waive one or more of the conditions in Subsection (q);
(r) any transaction involving a commodity contract or commodity option; and
(s) any transaction as to which the division finds that registration is
not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors.
(3) Every person filing an exemption notice or application shall pay a filing
fee as determined under Section 61-1-18.4.
(4) Upon approval by a majority of the Securities Advisory Board, the director, by means of an adjudicative proceeding conducted in accordance with

Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, may deny or revoke
any exemption specified in Subsection (l)(g), (h), or (j) or in Subsection (2)
with respect to:
(a) a specific security, transaction, or series of transactions; or
(b) any person or issuer, any affiliate or successor to a person or issuer,
or any entity subsequently organized by or on behalf of a person or issuer
generally and may impose a fine if he finds that the order is in the public
interest and that:
(i) the application for or notice of exemption filed with the division
is incomplete in any material respect or contains any statement
which was, in the light of the circumstances under which it was
made, false or misleading with respect to any material fact;
(ii) any provision of this chapter, or any rule, order, or condition
lawfully imposed under this chapter has been willfully violated in
connection with the offering or exemption by:
(A) the person filing any application for or notice of exemp
tion;
(Bj the issuer, any partner, officer, or director of the issuer,
any person occupying a similar status or performing similar
functions, or any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, but only if the person filing the application
for or notice of exemption is directly or indirectly controlled by or
acting for the issuer; or
(C) any underwriter;
(iii) the security for which the exemption is sought is the subject of
an administrative stop order or similar order, or a permanent or
temporary injunction or any court of competent jurisdiction entered
under any other federal or state act applicable to the offering or
exemption; the division may not institute a proceeding against an
effective exemption under this subsection more than one year from
the date of the order or injunction relied on, and it may not enter an
order under this subsection on the basis of an order or injunction
entered under any other state act unless that order or injunction was
based on facts that would currently constitute a ground for a stop
order under this section;
(iv) the issuer's enterprise or method of business incluc
include activities that are illegal where performed;
(v) the offering has worked, has tended to work, or would operate
to work a fraud upon purchasers;
(vi) the offering has been or was made with unreasonable amounts
of underwriters' and sellers' discounts, commissions, or other compensation, or promoters' profits or participation, or unreasonable
amounts or kinds of options;
(vii) an exemption is sought "for a security or transaction which is
not eligible for the exemption; or
(viii) the proper filing fee, if required, has not been paid.
(5) (a) No order under Subsection (4) may operate retroactively.
(b) No person may be considered to have violated Section 61-1-7 or
61-1-15 by reason of any offer or sale effected after the entry of an order
under this subsection if he sustains the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the
order

76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Definitions — Civil penalties — Restitution —
Hearing — Aggravation or mitigation of crimes
with mandatory sentences — Resentencing.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution up
to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or victims of
the offense of which the defendant has been convicted, or to the victim
of any other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4Xc).

Rule 17. The trial.
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.

Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue.
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
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JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
LYNN NICHOLAS (6008)
Assistant Attorney General
DAVID N. SONNENREICH (4917)
Assistant Attorney General
111 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1331
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
AMENDED INFORMATION
vs.
JOHN B. TENNEY
DOB: May 6, 1940
SSN: 527-58-1361

Case No. 921004443
Judge Floyd Gowans

Defendant.

The undersigned, Michael E. Hines, states on
information and belief that the defendant, JOHN B. TENNEY,
committed the following crimes:
OFFERING OR SELLING UNREGISTERED SECURITIES, 13 COUNTS
SECURITIES FRAUD, 13 COUNTS
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES BROKER-DEALER OR SALES AGENT, 1 COUNT
EMPLOYING UNREGISTERED AGENTS, 2 COUNTS

00192

COUNTS 1 THROUGH 13
OFFERING OR SELLING UNREGISTERED SECURITIES
On or about July 29, 1986, to at least December 10,
1988, in Salt Lake County and elsewhere in the state of Utah, in
violation of the Section 61-1-7 of the Utah Uniform Securities
Act,1

defendant JOHN B. TENNEY, directly or indirectly, through

agents, willfully offered or sold securities without registration
under the Utah Uniform Securities Act when no exemption from
registration was available, to the following investors, among
others, on or about the following dates in the following amounts:

Investor

Amount

Date

Count 1.

Gerald Berg

$ 20,000

April 27, 1987

Count 2.

Jeffrey Stout

$

3,000

May 26, 1987

Count 3.

David Baker

$

5,000

August 14, 1987

Count 4.

John Cawley

$

8,000

August 25, 1987

Count 5.

Ronald Frost

$ 10,000

October 8, 1987

Count 6.

David Ingraham

$

2,500

October 7, 1987

Count 7.

Kristy and
Phillip Holmes

$

500

October 19, 1987

Count 8.

Dale and Shirley
Panting

$

5,950

January 15, 1988

1

The Utah Uniform Securities Act is set forth at Utah
Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 through 61-1-30 (1986).
2
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1,000

January 20, 1988

Count 10. Richard Ulibarri

$ 3,000

January 20, 1988

Count 11. Rocky Ulibarri

$

January 22, 1988

Count 12. James Zieglowsky

$133,000

May 13, 1988

Count 13. Marlene Peterson

$

July 20, 1988

Count 9.

Jeffrey Ulibarri

$

1,000

2,000

These violations of law are unclassified felonies under Section
61-1-21 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act.
COUNTS 14 THROUGH 26
SECURITIES FRAUD
On or about July 29, 1986, through at least December
10, 1988, in the state of Utah, in violation of Section 61-1-1 of
the Utah Uniform Securities Act, defendant JOHN B. TENNEY, in
connection with the offer or sale of securities, directly or
indirectly, willfully: (1) employed a device, scheme or artifice
to defraud; or (2) made an untrue statement of material fact or
omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading; or (3) engaged in an act,
practice or course of business which operated or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon the following investors, among others, on
or about the following dates:

3
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Investor

Date

Count 14,

Gerald Berg

April 27, 1987

Count 15,

Jeffrey Stout

May 26, 1987

Count 16,

David Baker

August 14, 1987

Count 17-

John Cawley

August 25, 1987

Count 18,

Ronald Frost

October 8, 1987

Count 19,

David Ingraham

October 7, 1987

Count 20,

Kristy and
Phillip Holmes

October 19, 1987

Count 21.

Dale and Shirley
Panting

January 15, 1988

Count 22.

Jeffrey Ulibarri

January 20, 1988

Count 23,

Richard Ulibarri

January 20, 1988

Count 24,

Rocky Ulibarri

January 22, 1988

Count 25-

James Zieglowsky

May 13, 1988

Count 26.

Marlene Peterson

July 20, 1988

These violations of law are unclassified felonies under Section
61-1-21 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act.

UU1JJ

COUNT 27
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES BROKER-DEALER OR SALES AGENT
From on or about July 29, 1986, through at least
December 10, 1988, in the state of Utah, defendant JOHN B. TENNEY
engaged in violations of Section 61-1-3 of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act by willfully transacting business in Utah as a
broker-dealer or agent without being licensed as such with the
Utah Division of Securities.

This violation of law is an

unclassified felony under Section 61-1-21 of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act.
COUNTS 28 THROUGH 29
EMPLOYING UNREGISTERED AGENTS
From at least April 27, 1987 through at least January
22, 1988, in the state of Utah, defendant JOHN B. TENNEY

engaged

in violations of Section 61-1-3(2) of the Utah Uniform Securities
Act by willfully employing the following persons, among others,
as unregistered agents in the offer or sale of securities to the
investors listed above:

Count 28.

Steven Rick Jensen

Count 29.

Steven Bowers

5
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These violations of law are unclassified felonies under Section
61-1-21 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act.
This Information is based upon evidence from witnesses
listed in the Affidavit of Probable Cause.

j
day of

Authorized for presentment and filing this

yy\a^fiJ^

, 1993.
R^^MHi=3ZAN~ESM
Attorney General

By:

DATED this

3

:<^<o
LYNN NICHOLAS
Assistant Attorney General

t-cf
day of

1993

Affia!

Michael E. Hines appeared before me this
j

day of

1 9 9 3 , and attested that the foregoing

information is true to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief.

00197

ADDENDUM C
Judgment

IN T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE O F J J T A H

JUL 29 4i#fH r 93

THE STATE OF UTAH,
to ^
A!
jtf&JMENT, SENTENCE
*=•" ^ f r ^ , j / ^ M j f l M M I T M E N T )

BT

Plaintiff,

v

vs.

I

Case No.

Q3iQmn«ifi

r.n.,ntMn 1

TENNEY, JOHN B.

^

Clerk
Reporter
Defendant

•?

4.

5.

6.

7.

R.

Q.

Hnnnrahte Tyrone E. Medley
S.
P.

Hensley
Tripp

Bailiff

P.

Bivprs

Date

July

26,

1993

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by & x jury; • the court-D plea of .guilty'
D plea of no contest; of the offense of o f f e r i n g o r s e l l i n g u n r e g i s t e r e d s T e c u r ^ i e ^ s
of the
degree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by p r o R P
, and the State being represented by C . B a r l o w is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:

x not to exceed three years
u
D
D
D
D
D
D
x

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
;
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to

Counts 15, 17, 18 and 27 to be served consecuhivply

D such sentence is to run concurrently with
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s)
are hereby dismissed.
D
Q£ Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Ocprison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
72 m o n t h s
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
D Commitment shall issue
DATED this
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

10,

1

1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF U T A H
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,

vs.
TENNEY, JOHN B.

Defendant.

I

Case No. 921901056

\

Count No 1 4 , 1 5 ,

'

Honorable Tyrone E. Medley
Clerk
S. H e n s l e y
Reporter D- Tripp
Bailiff
R. R i v e r s
Date
J u l y 26 y 1993

11,

18 f 19 f 20 f 2 1 , 2

23, 2
25, 2

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by Oca jury; D the court; D plea of guilty;

D plea of no contest; of the offense of

s e c u r i t i e s fraud

ta

felony

of the
degree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by P r o s e
, and the State being represented by C . B a r l o w is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:

x

not to exceed three years

D
D
D
D
D
D
D

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
;
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to

D
D
D
D
£1

such sentence is to run concurrently with
such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion of • State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s)

x

Counts 15, 17, 18 and 27 to be served consecutively

are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( g prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
72 m o n t h s
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
D Commitment shall issue

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff.

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

v

vs.

I
\

TENNEY, JOHN B.

Case No.
^cunt N ^
Clerk
Reporter
Bailiff
natA

Defendant.

921901056
^ronft

E

.

M e d l

^

S. Hensley
D- Tripp
R. R i v e r s
J u l y 2 6 , 1993

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by I j a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of u n r e g i s t e r e d s e c u r i t i e s b r o k e r o r s a l ^ A f i g ^
of the
degree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by p-rn R P
and the State being represented by C . B a r l o w j S now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:

x

not to exceed three years

D
•
D
D
•
D
D

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
;
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to

D
•
D
D
B

such sentence is to run concurrently with
such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s)

x

Counts 15, 17, 18 and 27 to be served consecutively

are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above (H prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
72 m o n t h s
t pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
D Defendant is remanded intothecustodyoftheSheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
D Commitment shall issue
DATED this

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

2 6 t h

da

t
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff.

J
f

TENNEY, JOHN B.

Case No.
Count No.
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter
Bailiff

Defendant

'

Date

9 2 1 9 0 1 0 5 6
28

' 29
Tyrone E. Medley
S. H e n s l e y
g-

griPP

R. R i v e r s
J u l y 2 6 , 1993

D The motion of
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by B a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty;

D plea of no contest; of the offense of

employing u n r e g i s t e r e d

agents

, a felony
of the
degree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by p r o s e
, and the State being represented hy C . B a r l o w is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:

x
D
D
D
D
D
D
D

x
D
•
D
D
a

not to exceed three years
to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
;
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to

Counts 15, 17, 18 and 27 to be served consecutively
such sentence is to run concurrently with
such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion of D State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s)

are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above $Ekprison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
montns
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
D Commitment shall issue
DATED t h i s 2 6 t h
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

Judgment/State v. TENNEY, JOHN B ,

921901056
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CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
D Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole.
B Serve
one year
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing
forthwith
D Pay a fine in the amount of $
D at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole; or D at the rate of
H Pay restitution in the amount of $
; or Cjkin an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of
; or • at a rate to be determined by
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
• Enter, participate in, and complete any
program, counseling, or treatment as
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Enter, participate in, and complete the
program at
D Participate in and complete any • educational; and/or • vocational training D as directed by the
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with
D Participate in and complete any
training D as directed by the Department of Adult
Probation and Parole; or • with
D Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs.
D Submit to drug testing.
D Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs.
• Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally.
D Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances.
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
D Submit to testing for alcohol use.
D Take antabuse D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment.
D Maintain full-time employment.
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling.
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling.
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to
under the Interstate Compact as approved
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
a Complete lOOOhnurs of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole.
D Complete
hours of community service restitution in lieu of
days in jail.
a Defendant is to commit no crimes.
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on
for a review of this sentence.

(3 Become full-time employed except for selling securities,
g; Defendant to obtain any mental health counseling recommended by AP&P,
IX Defendant to be supervised by I.S.P.
D
D
D
DATED this
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ADDENDUM D
Motion for New Trial, Memorandum and Affidavits
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Prose

TENNEY
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_

JUL 2 6 1993

8415 Kings Hill Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 942-8144
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 921901056FS
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY

JOHN B. TENNEY
Defendant.

Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendant, JOHN B. TENNEY, hereby moves this Court
for an order granting the defendant a new trial in the abovereferenced case.

This motion is based on the ground of impropriety

on the part of Dr. Richard L. Barnett, a juror, which impropriety
had a substantial adverse affect upon the rights of the defendant.
The grounds for this motion are more fully set forth in a
Memorandum in Support of Motion for a New Trial and Affidavit of
Richard D. Christensen.
DATED this J?/A day of July, 1993.

JOHN B. TENNEY
Pro Se

CC778
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Charlene
Barlow, Assistant Attorney General Office, 111 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84114, this p77#-day of July, 1993,
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Third Juciicsai District

JUL 2 6 1993

JOHN B. TENNEY
Pro Se
8415 Kings Hill Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 942-8144
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:
:

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

v.
JOHN B. TENNEY,

:

Case No. 921901056FS
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY

Defendant.

I. Background
On June 1, 1993, a jury of eight persons rendered a
verdict against John B. Tenney on twenty-seven counts of
selling unregistered securities, securities fraud, employing
unlicensed agents, and acting as an unlicensed broker-dealer.
The trial was held in Third District Court in Salt Lake City,
Utah, the Honorable Judge Tyrone Medley presiding.
Dr. Richard Barnett, an orthodonist with offices in
Salt Lake City and West Valley served as a member of the jury.
Some weeks after the verdict in the above case, Lynda Tenney,
wife of John Tenney ("Tenney"), was in the West Valley dental
office of Dr.

Richard Christensen to have some dental work

done and overheard comments about statements which Dr. Barnett
had made to persons in the dental clinic during the course of

of the trial.
On July 26, 1993, Tenney filed a Motion for a New Trial,
This motion is accompanied by Affidavits of two persons with
whom Dr. Barnett discussed the case and to whom he made statements which indicated that he had a strong prejudicial bias
against Tenney, and which made it impossible for Dr. Barnett
to render a fair and impartial decision in this case. These
discussions were had and the prejudicial statements were made
before all of the evidence was presented in the case.
This Brief reviews several issues and cites legal references which show why Tenney1s motion should be granted by the
Court.

II. Grounds For a New Trial
The Motion for a New Trial was filed pursuant to Rule 24
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Practice statutes and rules of practice enumerate as one
of the grounds of new trial misconduct of the jury which
affects the substantial rights of the defendant and prevents
a fair and impartial trial.
67 S.D. 151, 290 N.W. 322.

Carpenter v. Union Banking Co,,
Newman v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 559,

240 S.W. 312.
Misconduct of the jury, when of a prejudicial character
or such as to warrant the belief that the fairness and propriety
of the trial have been affected and impaired, that injury has
resulted therefrom, is a proper cause for a new trial.
Emporia v. Juengling, 78 Kan. 595, 96 P. 850.

G0783

Where prejudice has, or probably has, resulted to an
unsuccessful party from jury misconduct, that party is entitled
to a new trial provided he or she was without fault in bringing
the misconduct.
Jones v. People,
445;

People v. Stokes, 103 Cal. 193, 37 P. 207;
6 Colo. 452;

Pettibone v. Phelps, 13 Conn.

State v. Shaw, 79 Kan. 396, 100 P. 78;

Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 76 N.E. 127;
435, 84 A. 42;

Commonwealth v.

Blodgett v. Park, 76 N.H.

State v. Robidon, 20 N.D. 518, 128 N.W. 1124;

White Cabs v. Moore, 146 Tex. 101, 203 S.W.2d 200;

St. Louis

S.W.R. Co. v. Robinson (Tex. Comm. App.) 285 S.W. 269, 46
A.l.r. 1507;

McDaniels v. McDaniels, 40 VT. 363;

State v.

Wilson, 42 Wash. 56, 84 P. 409.
One court has taken the position that where a statute
prescribing the grounds for a new trial includes the ground,
"misconduct of the jury," the losing party, who moves for a
new trial on the ground of misconduct of a member of the jury,
does not need to show his or her rights were prejudiced but
only that there is a possibility of undue influence .
Barnhart v. International Harvester Co., (Okla.), 441 P.2d
1,000.
Furthermore, many courts have taken the position that
since jury misconduct challenges fundamental rights to an
unprejudiced jury and fairness of the trial proceedings,
the issue of the prejudicial effect of such misconduct is a
clear-cut appellate issue if the trial court refuses to
grant a new trial.

Andrews v. County of Orange (4th Dist.)

130 Cal. App. 3d 944, 182 Cal. Rptr. 176 (disagreed with by

~3 ""
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Aguirre v. Drevry Chemical Co. (4th Dist.) 162 Cal. App. 3d
187, 208 Cal. Rptr. 390, op withdrawn by order of c t . ) ;
People v. Brown (5th Dist.) 61 Cal. App. 3d 476, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 217.

III. Vitiating The Verdict
Where misconduct is proved it will presumptively
the verdict.

vitiate

Babb v. State, 18 Ariz. 505, 163 P. 259; State

v. Harris, 69 W.Va. 244, 71 S.E. 609.

Misconduct on the part

of any one of the individuals composing

the jury as the result

of which a fair, due, and impartial consideration of the case
may have been prevented is to be regarded as misconduct of the
jury vitiating the verdict.
185 Kan. 6, 340 P.2s 379;
16 S.W. 2d 235;
622;

Adams vy

Thomas v. Kansas Power & Light Co.,
Bolt v. State, 112 Tex. Crim. 267,

Taylor v. State, 101 Tex. Crim. 201, 274 S.W.
State, 92 Tex. Crim. 264, 243 S.W. 474.

IV. Acts Of One Are Acts Of All
The jury can act only as a unit, and the misconduct of one
of the members cannot be segregated.

Thomas v. Kansas Power &

Light, supra;

Taylor v. State, supra;

Bolt v. State, supra;

Adams v. State, supra.

Improper conduct of one juror is

chargeable to the whole panel.

Corpus Juris cited in Blakeney

v. Alabama Power Co., 133 So. 16, 20, 222 Ala. 394;
Oregon Stages, 277 P. 291, 129 Or. 435;

Martin v.

Hansen v. Miller,

276 N.W. 150, 65 S.D. 546.
- 4 c r *7 o r:

V. Prejudice Or Ill-Will Of Juror
It is within the discretion of the trial court to
declare a mistrial in a criminal jury trial when it is shown
that a juror is or becomes so prejudiced during the trial
that he or she cannot serve as a fair and impartial juror
and give both the state and defendant a fair trial.

State

of Kansas v. Howard, 557 P.2d 1280, 1285 (1976).
A defendant is entitled to be tried by a jury of fair
and impartial persons, and trial court may, in the exercise
of its discretion, grant a mistrial if it reasonably appears
that one or several members of a jury have become biased and
will not engage in honest deliberation.

Merritt v. First

Judicial District Court, 67 Nev. 604.
Where it was uncontradicted that one juror
had stated to another person before submission of the case
in reference to the defendant, "he is guilty," it was clear
that the juror had prejudiced the case by expressing a clear
opinion of guilt before he had heard all of the evidence serious misconduct which required a new trial.

People v.

Brown (5th Dist.) 61 Cal. App. 3d 476, 132 Cal. Rptr. 217.
The fact that during the progress of the trial and
before submission of the case a juror has made statements
outside the jury room concerning the case or evidence offered
therein, indicating a fixed opinion unfavorable to the losing
party or ill-will toward him, is ground for a new trial.

- 5 -
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Blakeney v. Alamba Power Co,, supra;
Stages, supra;

Martin v. Oregon

Hansen v. Miller, supra,

Although the case

for a new trial is stronger if the opinion was expressed
after a conversation with the other party, a new trial
should be allowed where the juror was clearly prejudiced.
Pool v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., C.C. Iowa, 6 F.844, 2 McCrary
251.
Statements of jurors during the progress of the trial
disclosing that they have made up their minds as to the
verdict without regard to the evidence that has been or will
be produced in the case, or revealing antagonism toward the
defendant, is ground for a new trial.
of Orange, supra;

Andrews v. County

York v. Wyman, 115 Me. 353, 98 A. 1,024;

McKahan v. Baltimore & O.R.Co., 223 Pa. 1, 72 A. 251;
Goodright v. M!Causland (Pa.) 1 Yeates 372;

French v. Smith,

4 Vt. 363; Rowe v. Shenandoah Pulp Co., 42 W.Va. 551, 26
S.E. 320.

VI. Juror Disregard Of Court's Instructions
When the court has instructed the individual jurors not
once, but many times, to not discuss the case with anyone
during the trial and to keep an open mind and to not form
an opinion until all of the evidence is in, and when a juror,
in disregard of the court's instructions, does the opposite,
these are grounds for a new trial.
- 6 r p"; o n

A new trial may be granted for such misconduct where the
guilty juror has shown his disregard for the court's instructions,

Hansen v. Miller, supra.

The seriousness of such juror disregard and misconduct
arises from the fact that any private communication by a
juror in a criminal case on any subject connected with the
trial is presumptively prejudicial.

Remmer v. United States,

347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954);

Conforte

v. State, 77 Nev. 269, 362 P. 2d 274 (1961).

VII. Juror Misconduct Not Known Until After The Trial
A new trial may be granted where the juror's misconduct
was not known to the losing party until after the trial.
Hansen v. Miller, supra.
Where the misconduct occurs before submission of the
case, and the complaining party who is filing the motion
does not learn about it before the verdict is rendered, the
failure to make an objection before verdict cannot affect
the right to apply for a new trial.

Tex. & N.O.R. Co. v.

Underhill C.A.5 Tex.) 234 F.2d 620, 64 A.L.R.2d 152.
An affidavit obtained after sentence has been passed
can be used to support an objection later.

State v. Robinson,

20 W. Va. 713 (superceded by statute on other grounds as
stated in State v. Young (W.Va.) 311 S.E. 2d 118, later
proceeding (W.Va.) 317 S.E.2d 812).

vi t bib

VIII. Burden On State To Rebut
If the juryfs impartiality has been adversly affected,
or if the prosecution's burden of proof has been lightened;
if the answer to either of these questions is in the affirmative, the defendant has been prejudiced and there is no rebuttal of the presumption of prejudice.

People v. Andrews

(2nd Dist.) 149 Cal. App. 3d 358, 196 Cal. Rptr. 796, 46
A.L.R. 4th 1.
Many jurisdictions take the position that jury misconduct
in a criminal case raises a presumption of prejudice and,
unless the prosecution rebuts that presumption by proof that
no prejudice actually resulted, the defendant is entitled to
a new trial.

People v. Pierce, 24 Cal 3d 199, 155 Cal. Rptr.

657, 595 P.2d 91;

People v. Andrews (2nd Dist.) 149 Cal.

App. 3d 358, 196 Cal. Rptr. 796, 46 AL.R. 4th 1;
v. Sutter (5th Dist.) 134 Cal.

People

App. 3d 806, 184 Cal Rptr. 829.

The burden is on the state to show that these communications had no prejudicial effect which was adverse to the
defendant.

Remmer v. United States, supra; Parsons v. State,

74 Nev. 302, 329 P-2d 1070 (1958).

IX. The Test Of Juror Misconduct Resulting In Prejudice To
The Defendant
The test in a criminal case is not whether the jurors
were actually prejudiced by misconduct of one or more jurors
but whether any member of the jury might have been so pre-

CC789

judiced.

Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 704, 70 S.E.

2d 284.
It need not be shown that the verdict was actually
influenced by such misconduct.

Cooper v. Carr, 126 N.W.

468, 161 Mich. 405.
Where evidence taken on a motion for a new trial leaves
it reasonable doubtful whether misconduct of the jury
resulted in injury, the motion should be granted.
St. Louis S.W.R. Co. v. Robinson (Tex. Com. App.) 285 S.W.
269, 46 A.L.R. 1,507.

Dated this 2 h ^

day of July, 1993.

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing
to Charlene Barlow, Assistant Attorney General Office, 111
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
<y(o jj^

day of July, 1993.
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JOHN B. TENNEY
Pro Se
8415 Kings Hill Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 942-8144
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN B. TENNEY

:

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD D. CHRISTENSEN

:
:
:

Case No. 921901056FS
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY

Defendant.
This Affidavit is given under oath and is based upon
personal knowledge:
1.

My name is RICHARD D. CHRISTENSEN, D.D.S. and I am a

dentist who operates a partnership with Dr. Richard L. Barnett.
2.

That on or about May 25, 1993, I was in the office I

share with Dr. Barnett.
3.

That on or about May 25, 1993, Dr. Barnett came into

the office at approximately 5:00 p.m. and informed me that due to
jury duty he was holding office hours between 5:00 p.m. and 11:00
p.m.
4.

That during the above-reference^conversation Dr.

Barnett indicated to me that it was his understanding that a friend
WAS

^c

of mine was involved in the case for which heAserving as a juror.
5.

In this conversation it was indicated that John B.

Tenney was the Defendant in a criminal case involving securities
fraud upon which Dr. Barnett sat as a juror.

CG791

6.

In this conversation I indicated to Dr. Barnett that I

in fact did know John B. Tenney•
7.

That during this conversation Dr. Barnett made the

statement "that he is really a bad guy."
8.

That from the context of the conversation it was clear

that Dr. Barnett was referring to John B. Tenney.
9.

That following Dr. Barnett/s characterization of John

B. Tenney as "a bad guy" I indicated to Dr. Barnett that my
experiences with John Tenney had been all good.
10. In response to my statement Dr. Barnett stated that, "I
know, I shouldn't talk about it at all."
11. The above conversation which took place on or about May
25, 1993, ended at that point.
DATED this ^ 6 day of July, 1993.

RICHARD D. CHRISTENSEN, D.D.S.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
County of Salt Lake

n r ~ C\ o

JOHN B. TENNEY
Pro Se
8415 Kings Hill Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 942-8144

JUL 2 6 1993
SALT LAKE COJKTY
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF MARGARET WALLACE

Plaintiff,
V.

JOHN B. TENNEY

Case No. 921901056FS
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY

Defendant,
This Affidavit is given under oath and is based upon
personal knowledge:
1.

My name is MARGARET WALLACE, and I work in the office

of Dr. Richard D. Christensen and Dr. Richard L. Barnett.
2.

That on or about May 25, 1993, I was in their office.

3.

That on or about May 25, 1993, Dr. Barnett came into

the office at approximately 5:00 p.m. and stated that due to jury
duty he was holding office hours between 5:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.
4.

That during the above-reference^conversation Dr.

Barnett indicated that it was his understanding that a friend of Dr.
Christensen was involved in the case for which he serving as a juror.
5.

In this conversation it was indicated that John B.

Tenney was the Defendant in a criminal case involving securities
fraud upon which Dr. Barnett sat as a juror.

f- r. ~ T *

6.

That during this conversation Dr. Barnett made the

statement "that he is really a bad guy."
7.

That from the context of the conversation it was clear

that Dr. Barnett was referring to John B. Tenney.
DATED thisryfo day of July, 1993.

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

:ss.

On the /^/^^5ay of July, 1993, personally appeared before
me, MARGARET WALLACE, the signer of the foregoing iijstrument, who
duly acknowledged to me that he executed/the sai

- - - . • :

vP.-.^

,

(/Mir/fa/os rfTL
My Commission Expires

» //y/y

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Charlene
Barlow, Assistant Attorney General Office, 111 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84114, this 2*6'flC day of July, 1993,

£L

/%. xj^~^r
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JAN GRAHAM #1231
Utah Attorney General
CHARLENE BARLOW #0212
Assistant Attorney General
LYNN NICHOLAS #6008
Assistant Attorney General
111 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
(801) 538-1331
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
: RICHARD L. BARNETT
: Case No. 921901056

JOHN B. TENNEY,
Defendant.

: Judge Tyrone Medley
:

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
I, RICHARD L. BARNETT, DDS, after being duly sworn, hereby
depose and state that:
1.

I am currently licensed to practice dentistry within the

State of Utah and am self-employed as an orthodontist residing in
Salt Lake County, Utah.
2.

My current dental practice is located at 9229 South

Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah where I office-share with Dr.

Richard Christensen.

My wife, Tammy Barnett, is employed by

me as a receptionist/office manager.
3.

On May 18, 1993 I was called to report for jury duty to

the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah.

I was

subsequently selected as a juror for the subject trial.
4.

On or about May 25, 1993, I made a brief visit to my

office after leaving Court. My wife was working that morning and,
upon my walking into the office, my wife made the statement to me
that:

"You're not going to believe this, but Dick knows John

Tenney."
5.

I expressed some surprise and went about my business.
After finishing with a patient, Dr. Christensen came into

the room where I was at and told me that he knew John Tenney.

I

advised him that I could not talk about the case until after the
trial.
6.

After a short discussion about Dr. Christensen knowing

Mr. Tenney, I made a statement to the effect that Mr. Tenney
appeared to be a "slick operator" but I didn't know at this time if
he had broken any laws.

I also stated that I would have to wait

until after hearing all of the evidence before I decided.
7.

I did not feel that I discussed anything with Dr.

Christensen which would have any influence upon my decision in this
case.

8.

I had not made any personal decision at that point in

time as to Mr. Tenney's guilt or innocence.
DATED this if*? day of

1993.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
1993.

day of August,

• liJJexi/
Residing Wn
SCHERE£fc.WiLCC*< A
257 East 200 South #C£0]J
Saft Lake Cisy. Utah 841 i1
My Commission Espies -»

MYOpmmLssion Expiresv-

State cf Utah
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ADDENDUM E
Restitution Order
Portion of
Transcript of Restitution Hearing

Third Judicial L;:stnct

OCT 1 9 1994
!\_LO-».'i Y

Dy^L.

fce^uiy Clerk

JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212)
LYNN NICHOLAS (6008)
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1331

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

a\H3\o51
\G^-M4-%-.05c^

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

v.
Case No. 921901056
JOHN B. TENNEY,
Judge Tyrone Medley
Defendant.
This matter came on for hearing on September 6, 1994,
at 9:00 a.m., for a determination of the amount of restitution
owed by defendant.

Restitution had been ordered at sentencing

after defendant was convicted by jury of twenty-seven counts of
violations of securities law.

Defendant was present and

represented by counsel, Richard Uday, Salt Lake Legal Defenders
Association; the State was represented by Charlene Barlow and
Lynn Nicholas, Assistant Attorneys General.
THE COURT, having been fully advised in the premises,
now enters its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order.

n^sni

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant has insisted throughout the proceedings

that he intends to pay back the victims who purchased stock in
his company.
2.

Defendant is employable and capable of paying the

3.

There is no dispute between the parties regarding

victims.

the following victims and restitution amounts:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
4.

Gerald R. Berg
Jeffrey Stout
John E. Cawley
Ronald A. Frost
David Ingraham
Phillip Holmes
Shirley (Dale) Panting
Jeffrey Ulibarri
Richard Ulibarri

$20,000
3,000
8,000
10,000
2,500
500
5,950
1,000
3,000

The restitution owing another victim, James

Zieglowsky, was disputed by the parties and was the subject of
the restitution hearing.
5.

The proffered facts relating to defendant's sale of

stock to Mr. Zieglowsky are set forth in the State's memorandum
in support of restitution filed on September 6, 1994.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has read the cases cited by defendant in

his memorandum regarding restitution and concludes that those
cases are distinguishable from the present case.

The restitution

-2-
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asked for regarding Mr. Zieglowsky is more directly related to
the criminal conviction than is apparent in the cases cited by
defendant.
2.

The calculations regarding Mr, Zieglowsky's losses

attributable to defendant which are contained in the State's
memorandum are fair, reasonable, equitable and even conservative
given the Court's ability to order up to double the amount of
pecuniary loss as restitution.
3.

The amount of $39,000 is the proper amount of

restitution for Mr. Zieglowsky based on the analysis provided in
the State's memorandum.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1.

Defendant is to pay restitution to the following

victims in the following amounts:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
gh.

Gerald R. Berg
Jeffrey Stout
John E. Cawley
Ronald A. Frost
David Ingraham
Phillip Holmes
Shirley (Dale) Panting
Jeffrey Ulibarri

$20,000
3,000
8,000
10,000
2,500
500
5,950
1,000

-3-
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i.
j.

Richard Ulibarri
James Zieglowsky

DATED this

If

3,000
39,000

day of October, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

MEDLEY
ct Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, this

11

day of October,

1994, to:
Richard Uday, Esq.
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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key to the apartment.

And, in fact, when Mr. Zieglowsky

walked away from the apartment, as counsel indicated, he
was not given notice that he was to then assume those
responsibilities, nor did he receive the wherewithal to
assume those responsibilities.
He would further indicate for purposes of a
payment schedule for restitution that he is presently
employed at Advantage Mortgage making a gross amount of
$1500 a month.
month.

That turns out to be a net of $1350 a

The probation department and he have figured out

a $200 a month restitution payment is owed, leaving for
Mr. Tenney and the family of five, $1150 a month income.
The only assets that he has are an '86 Cadillac
that they are sharing between the four licensed drivers.
MR. TENNEY:
MR. UDAY:
working.

That is correct.

And the second car, that is not

Presently needs about $650 worth of

transmission work.

That would be Mr. Tenney"s testimony

if he were to testify today.
If the Court would like, I could indicate our
dispute with the 19,000 to Mr. Zieglowsky.
THE COURT:
MR. UDAY:

Go ahead, sir.
Thank you. Your Honor.

Basically,

the other $19,000 that has been talked about by counsel
today, we would argue is not appropriate restitution.

In
12

essence, our position would be, Judge, that that amount
of money would fall into the province of civil
litigation, if anything at all, and that Mr. Zieglowsky
should not have the benefit of the Attorney General's
Office to pursue this claim on his behalf.
The support we would have for that argument.
Your Honor, flows from a fairly recent case called "State
vs. Burton," from the Utah Appellate Court, if I may
approach.

I have handed counsel this case as well.
In this case briefly, Judge, what occurred was

a real estate transaction, not unlike the one that
occurred here.

In essence, an individual who could not

obtain a loan to purchase a property bought the property
on a Contract of Sale. Where he agreed to pay "A," MAM
agreed to pay "B," and "B" would in theory pay the
mortgage company.

What happened is "A" paid "B."

Everything was fine for a while.

M

B" then did not at one

point continue in his payment to the mortgage company.
The mortgage company foreclosed on who was "A" living in
the home or having possession of the home.

"A" then

sought the services of the County Attorney's Office who
prosecuted a theft case against "B," and the Court at
page 819 of that opinion indicated that they are slow to
give approval to the broad construction of theft that was
urged by the state in that particular case.

Basically
13
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holding that that, in fact, is a civil matter; that the
contractor that was involved in that situation between
those parties had obligations that were civil in nature.
If someone defaulted in that obligation, that the claim
should have been pursued civilly as a civil remedy,
rather than a criminal.

Clarifying the subsequent case,

that it is not a question of whether there is another
remedy, civil versus criminal, you can't have both in a
particular case.

But that this type of contract dispute

over real estate property is a civil matter and did not
include criminal considerations.
I think closely related to this Burton case is
the case I recall from, I believe it is the Court of
Appeals as well. State vs. Robinson, which was an
individual in Circuit Court, pled guilty to a traffic
offense, maybe two traffic offenses and relating to an
automobile accident.

One was maybe a speeding or failure

to make the lane change properly, or something, and no
driver's license.

As part of the guilty plea in that

case, the Judge ordered 13,000-some-odd dollars
restitution for the injuries that were suffered by the
car who was hit by virtue of the traffic violation. The
Court, after answering some other issues that were
Presented before it, indicated that due process did not
allow the Court to order restitution in that collateral
14
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kind of a question primarily because it did not give the
offender in that situation a forum in which he could
dispute perhaps the causation factor or a combination of
co-negligence.
it.

Comparative negligence is what we call

I'm not working in that area of the law, and because

of that due process, prohibited the Court from ordering
that amount of restitution.
I would say that the combination of those two
cases in this incident ought to clarifv for us that Mr.
Tenney is not responsible for the $19,000. He did not
have any title or any physical possession of that
property in any way.

He never collected rents, but

perhaps when Mr. Zieglowsky walked away, that that is
really what happened.

He walked awav and rents were not

collected by anyone as the state suggested.

If that is

the case, there may be a comparative negligence kind of a
claim that Mr. Tenney could raise at some point, which
would then violate due process in this Court for the
Court to impose that additional amount of restitution
here.
Additionally, because there is a contract that
was signed by these parties and because these are
collateral issues to the sale of securities which he was
found guilty for by the jury, I believe that these are
collateral questions and the Court should not impose that
15
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additional $19,000 worth of restitution, and order 20,000
to Mr. Zieglowsky.

Thank you. Your Honor.

THE COURT:
Uday.

I have a guestion for you, Mr.

First of all, do you have a cite for the Robinson

case?
MR. UDAY:
approach.

I do.

It is 860 P2d 979.

If I may

Co-counsel is provided that a copy of that as

well. Your Honor.
THE COURT:

The other issue I want to raise

with you, Mr. Uday, and I will give Ms. Barlow a chance
to respond to that, the jury in this case found Mr.
Tenney guilty of what amounts to a fraud case for the
most part.

I mean, I recognize the other differences,

but my concern is this, and I recognize this matter is on
appeal.
The restitution statute allows the Court under
appropriate circumstances to award restitution up to, I
think, double the amount. That is probably not a
verbatim quote, but I am wondering if you are aware of
any cases in the State of Utah that may have cited the
provision in the restitution statute allowing a trial
court to award up to double the amount of restitution?
And if you are aware of such a statute, do you know what
criteria ought to be met before a Court imposes up to
double the amount?
16
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL

Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN B. TENNEY,

Case No. 921901056FS
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY

Defendant.
The prosecutor stated in her opening statement that, this
case is about people being taken by a smooth talking salesman who
"defrauded" three hundred and thirty-three people out of their
money.

This statement as well as the theme of the prosecutor's

opening statement is not supported by any evidence in the record.
Since the prosecution has rested and since the burden is on the
state to come forth with all evidence necessary to support their
allegations, Mr. Tenney herein moves for a mistrial based on the
prejudicial and unsupported statements made during the prosecutor's
opening statement.
Court's follow the general rule that, "the assertion of
facts in an opening statement which are not proved during trial may
constitute grounds for a mistrial if there is a reasonable
possibility that the admissible evidence contributed to the
conviction."

State v. West, 617 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Mont. 1980).

00579

See

also State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984) (counsel is obligated
to avoid reference to those matters the jury is not justified in
considering, and where there was no compelling proof of defendant's
guilt, court concluded reversal was required because jurors probably
were influenced by the improper remarks).
The Court has already ruled that the prejudicial affect of
the shareholder list outweighed the probative value of its
admission.

In suppressing the introduction of the shareholder list,

the Court expressed its concern over the impact such a list would
have upon the jury.

This concern is magnified when applied to the

opening statement declaration that Mr. Tenney had "defrauded" three
hundred and thirty-three people.

This evidence has not been

solicited through the state's factual witnesses and the mere numbers
is highly inflammatory and prejudicial to Mr. Tenney.
Approximately, the first sentence out of the prosecutor's
mouth referred to Mr. Tenney "defrauding" three hundred and
thirty-three people.

The primacy of this statement and the

inability of the state to bring forward any evidence of any
shareholder being defrauded, beyond the thirteen listed in the
information, establishes a reasonable possibility that the
inadmissible evidence would contribute to a conviction.
West, 617 P.d at 1300.

State v.

Therefore, this court should grant Mr.

Tenney's motion for a mistrial.
DATED this J J JC day of May, 1993.

B. TENNEY
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1

Utah, defendant John B. Tenney engaged in violations of

2

Section 61-1-3, subsection 2 of the Utah Securities Act,

3

by willfully employing the following persons, among

4

others, as unregistered agents in the offer or sale of

5

securities to the investors listed above. And those two

6

alleged employees, in count 28, is alleged to be Steven

7

Rick Jensen and in count 29, it is alleged to be Steven

8

Bowers.

9

Mr. Tenney has entered a plea of not guilty.

10

To all of those charges, members of the jury,

Ms. Nicholas, you may go forward with your

11

opening statement.

12

MS. NICHOLAS:

Ladies and gentlemen, good

13

afternoon.

14

people who got taken in a securities scam.

15

taken by a smooth-talking salesman who sold them stock

16

that wasn't worth the paper it was written on. The

17

defendant, John Tenney, deliberately defrauded dozens of

18

decent people, 333 people, mostly citizens of Utah,

19

bought Cellwest stock for somewhere between 4 million and

20

$11 million.

21

of violating the Utah Blue Sky Law.

22

Uniform Securities Act, and we will talk about the Blue

23

Sky Law a little bit later. While Tenney was collecting

24

all of that money, investors were losing their shirts.

25

This is a case about innocent, hard-working
They got

So the State has charged him with 29 counts
That is the Utah

Let me tell you about one of those investors:
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1

Jim Zieglowsky, an ordinary Federal Express delivery man.

2

On a cold December morning in 1987, Jim got u p , put on

3

his Federal Express uniform, and went off to a training

4

conference.

5

co-workers, Rick Jensen.

6

deal.

7

was certain that stock was going to go sky high and he

8

was selling it himself, and he would introduce Jim to

9

John Tenney so that Jim could do the same thing.

During the break, he chatted with one of his
Rich told him about a hot stock

Rick said that he had invested in Cellwest and he

Jim has children.

Jim was

10

so excited.

He wants to send those

11

children to college and he thought this was an

12

opportunity to accumulate some money to send those kids

13

to college.

14

Callender's out on 7200 South.

15

cellular telephone in his hand and he told Jim about

16

Cellwest.

17

cellular telephones to car rentals.

18

idea whose time had come.

19

public in 90 days.

20

It was bound to be big, and the stock was going to be

21

listed on three stock exchanges.

22

to go to $50 a share by June.

23

went wrong, Tenney said, "I will enter into an agreement

24

with you.

I will buy the stock back in six months at $5

25

a share. M

That w a s more than double what Jim was going

So he met Tenney that very night at Marie
Tenney arrived with a

He said Cellwest is in the business of leasing
A great idea, an

The company was going to go

This was a ground floor opportunity.

And Tenney expected it

But Just in case something
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1

to have to pay for it at $2 a share.

2

Jim went home and talked to his wife Denna.

3

thought this was a good idea. And they decided maybe

4

this guaranteed Cellwest stock which seemed to be

5

virtually risk-free, was a better way to save to send

6

their kids to college.

7

said, "I don't have cash but I have got some property."

8

And Tenney said, "That is as good as cash.

9

into cash."

10

with Tenney.

11

stock.

12

so much that he bought stock for his children.

He bought

13

stock for Joshua.

He bought

14

stock for Crystal. He bought stock for Rachel.

So Jim went back to Tenney and he

I can turn it

So Jim entered into an exchange agreement
He exchanged his real estate for Cellwest

He believed in Cellwest.

15

He

He believed in Cellwest

He bought stock for Angela.

Time passed and Cellwest did not go public.

16

Cellwest wasn't listed on one exchange, much less three.

17

So Jim came to Tenney and said, "I want to exercise my

18

option under the agreement.

19

back at $5 a share."

20

wouldn't.

21

one piece of rental property out there. He had to pay

22

thousands in arrears on another piece because Tenney had

23

bothered to make the mortgage payments and it went into

24

foreclosure.

25

fund.

I want you to buy my stock

And Tenney said he couldn't. He

So Jim lost nearly everything he had.

He lost

And Jim's children didn't have a college
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1

(Jury leaves .)

2

THE COURT:

The record may reflect that

3

the Jury has been excused from the the courtroom.

4

parties are present, however.

5
6

Mr. Tenney, you have a motion which
you'd like to make?

7

MR. TENNEY:

Yes, I do, your Honor.

8

motion Ifd like to make, I've just handed to you in

9

written form.

10

The

The

I'd like to just orally make this

motion and argue it very briefly.

11

This is a motion for a mistrial.

And

12

the basis for this motion is that the Prosecutor, Lynn

13

Nicholas, stated in her opening statement that this

14

case is a case about people being taken by a

15

smooth-talking

16

people out of their money.

17

salesman who, quote, defrauded

333

This statement, as well as the theme of

18

the Prosecutor's opening statement, is not supported

19

by evidence in the record.

20

has rested and since the burden is on the State to

21

come forward with all the evidence that's necessary to

22

support their allegations, I move for a mistrial based

23

on the very serious prejudicial and unsupported

24

statement made during the opening statement by the

25

State.
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1

The Court, of course, follows the

2

general rule that, quote, the assertion of facts in an

3

opening statement which are not proved during trial

4

may constitute grounds for a mistrial if there is a

5

reasonable possibility that the admissible

6

contributed

7

quoting from State v. West 617 -- quoted

8

at 1298.

THE COURT:

MR. TENNEY:

in 617 P.2d

Do you have a copy of that

I don't have it.

I am

sorry, yes, I do.

13
14

That's

case?

11
12

to the conviction, end of quote*

It's a Montana 1980 case.

9
10

evidence

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

Are you through,

Mr. Tenney?

15

MR. TENNEY:

Not quite.

The —

counsel

16

is obligated

17

that the jury is not justified

18

I've argued forcefully earlier today, this is, I

19

think, a very serious prejudicial error.

20

there is no compelling proof of my guilt, the court in

21

this case concluded that reversal was required

22

the jurors probably were influenced by the improper

23

remarks.

24
25

to avoid any reference to any matters
in considering.

And as

And where

because

I think it is unquestionable that the
Jurors believe that there are 333 stockholders in the
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company based upon the statements made by the

2

statements made by the State in the opening

3

statement*

4

The Court has already ruled that the

5

prejudicial effect of this Stockholder List or

6

Shareholder List has outweighed probative value.

7

in suppressing the introduction of the Shareholders

8

List #

9

impact that this list would have on the Jury.

the Court also expressed

So,

its concern over the
And

10

it's magnified when we apply it to the opening

11

statement that Mr. Tenney, quote/ defrauded

12

people.

13

the State's factual witnesses, and the mere numbers

14

are highly inflammatory and prejudicial to me,

15

Mr. Tenney.

333

The evidence has not been solicited

16

through

Nearly the very first heard sentence ou

17

of the Prosecutor's mouth referred to me as, quote,

18

defrauding

19

the inability of the State to bring forward any

20

evidence of any such claim of any shareholder being

21

defrauded, other than those they've brought into the

22

court here as witnesses, establishes, clearly, a

23

reasonable possibility that the inadmissible

24

would, in fact, contribute to a conviction.

25

333 people.

This statement and the fact o

evidence

As I stated earlier, I'm greatly
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1

concerned about the effect it would have on the minds

2

and hearts of the Jurors.

3

here from State v. West, at 617 P•2d at 1300.

4

And, again, we are quoting

For this reason, the Court should grant

5

my motion for a mistrial at this time.

6

THE COURT;

7

Miss Barlow?

8

MS. BARLOW:

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Tenney.

Your Honor, I would like to

9

first correct -- the statement that Ms. Nicholas made

10

was that John Tenney deliberately defrauded dozens of

11

innocent -- excuse me, decent people, 333 people,

12

mostly citizens of Utah, were taken by that man for a

13

lot of money.

14

said.

So maybe to get correctly what was

She never did say he defrauded

15

333 people.

But that's -- the significant point is

16

that -- and I believe it's State v. Troy.

17

remember

18

a case —

19

there are certain matters -- well, when the Court is

20

looking at prosecutorial misconduct, which is what the

21

claim is here, the Court has a two-prong test:

22

did the person -- did the prosecutor say something

23

that the jury was not supposed to be privy to, and

24

then, number two, did it prejudice the case?

25

if that's the actual case name.

I can't
But there is

I believe it's State v. Troy -- that says

Granted, we mentioned
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Improper Expert Testimony

1

A

Well, there is a tendency for people to just

2

read as little as possible and so it is placed at the

3

beginning of the document to increase the likelihood that

4

they will at least have read the risks that are

5

associated with the securities being offered.

6

Q

Are you familiar with the concept of

7

materiality?

8

A

I am.

9

Q

In the securities law?

10

A

Uh-huh.

11

Q

What does that term mean under Utah law?

12

A

Well, materiality goes to the need for

13

disclosure.

14

with most jurisdictions, most states, is a statement that

15

all information that is of value to a reasonable investor

16

needs to be disclosed, so that investor can make an

17

informed investment decision.

18

Q

and it basically, in the State of Utah, as

So, would you say that material information is

19

the information that a reasonable investor would want to

20

know in making an investment decision?

21

A

That is correct.

22

Q

And if someone selling securities misrepresents

23

such information, is that a material misrepresentation?

24

A

That is.

25

Q

And if someone selling securities fails to
182
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1

disclose such material information, is that a material

2

omission?

3

A

It is. There has been a lack of disclosure.

4

Q

Are statements to the effect that a company is

5

going to go public imminently material?

6

A

Definitely material to the investor.

7

Q

Are statements that a company's stock will be

8
9

listed on an exchange, material?
A

Very much so. That gives the indication to the

10

investor, the potential or probability of later selling

11

the stock to someone else.

12
13

Q

Are predictions regarding stock prices

material?

14

A

Definitely.

15

Q

Are the risks inherent in a securities offering

16

material information?

17

A

It is.

18

Q

Would a reasonable investor want to know the

19

operating history of a company or the lack thereof?

20

A

Most definitely.

21

Q

Would a reasonable investor want to have an

22

opportunity to review the company's financial statements?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Is the nature of a company's competition in the

25

industry material information?
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1

A

That is very material.

If the company is

2

competing in a very competitive industry, then that

3

becomes a risk to the investor particularly if the

4

company offering the securities does not have the ability

5

to compete with those other companies.

6
7

Q

Are restrictions that might be placed on the

resale of a stock, is that material information?

8

A

Very much so.

9

Q

Is the nature of the market for a company stock

10
11
12

material information?
A

When you say "nature," I am assuming does a

market exist or does not exist?

13

Q

Correct.

14

A

That is true. That is material disclosure.

15

Q

And the proceeds of the offering, the use of

16

the proceeds of the offering, the use of the proceeds; is

17

that material information?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

The compensation of the company's officers, is

20
21

that material information?
A

Most definitely.

The investor wants to know

22

whether the money that he is investing is going to the

23

development and expansion of the company, or going into

24

the pockets of the officers of the company.

25 I

Q

Would a recent bankruptcy of a chief executive
184
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1

officer be material information?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

If an officer had violated, had previously been

4

found to have violated federal securities laws, would

5

that be material information?

6

A

That is very material, as with the bankruptcy

7

information because that goes to the ability of the

8

officer to manage the company, goes to his credibility,

9

his reliability as a manager.

And when investors invest

10

in companies, they are not just buying into the assets,

11

but rather into the management of the company as well.

12

Q

Mr. Nielsen, you have just listed several

13

categories of information that you view as material under

14

Utah Securities Law. Would the failure to disclose such

15

information be a material omission under Utah law?

16

A

17
18

MS. NICHOLAS: May I approach the witness, Your
Honor.

19
20

In my opinion, it would be.

THE COURT: You may.
Q

(By Ms. Nicholas) Mr. Nielsen, I am handing you

21

State's Exhibit 36 which has been previously admitted

22

into evidence

23

look at that exhibit.

24

review an exhibit that appears very similar to that prior

25

to coming here to testify today?

I would like to give you an opportunity to
Did you have an opportunity to
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1

This testimony is not being offered for the truth of

2

the -- of any matters contained within those

3

documents/ only as to what she reviewed

4

come to the conclusions which she's about to testify.

5

So the objection is noted, but overruled, Mr. Tenney.

6

THE WITNESS:

7

MS. NICHOLAS:

8
9

A.

in order to

Should I continue, then?
Yes, continue.

The Buy-sell Agreement between John B.

Tenney and Jeff Stout, which was dated

12-31-87; the

10

Articles of Cellwest, Inc., which is know is an

11

exhibit; the Articles of ReCom, Inc.; some

12

correspondence from Meredith and Bradford; an

13

Affidavit of Probable Cause in the Circuit Court and

14

the Information against Mr. Tenney in the Circuit

15

Court.

16

reviewed.

17

Q.

Those are the documents which I have

You indicated that you have reviewed one

18

of the Buy-sell Agreements, specifically the Buy-sell

19

Agreement between Mr. Tenney and Mr. Jeff Stout?

20

A.

Yes, I have.

21

Q.

In your opinion is that Buy-sell

22
23

Agreement a security?
A.

Yes, it is.

Under both federal law and

24

the three versions of the Utah Statute which I

25

reviewed, the agreement -- the Buy-sell Agreement says
43

KRENDL

WIT ST

01549

Dir

1
2
3

Q.

What does "material" mean under state

and federal securities laws?
A.

In a sentence, it means a substantial

4

likelihood that a reasonable investor would find it

5

important.

6

Q.

The information.

7

A.

The information important, right.

8

Q.

So all information that a reasonable

9
10

investor would want to know in making an investment
decision is material

information?

11

A.

That's correct.

That's correct.

12

Q.

If someone is selling securities and

13

misrepresents such information, is that a material

14

misrepresentation?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

If someone is selling securities and

17

fails to disclose such information, is that a material

18

omission?

19

A.

Yes, it is.

20

Q.

Are statements to the effect that a

21

company is going to go public imminently material?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Are statements that a company's stock

24
25

would be listed on a stock exchange material?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

Are predictions regarding stock prices

2

material?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Are the risks of an investment material?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Would a reasonable investor want to know

7

the operating history of a company or the lack

8

thereof?

9

A.

Very much, yes.

10

Q.

Would a reasonable investor want to have

11

an opportunity to review companies 1

12

statements?

financial

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Would a reasonable investor want to know

15

the nature of a company's

competition?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q*

Would a reasonable investor want to know

18

how the proceeds of an offering are to be used?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

The compensation of a company's

21

officers?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

That a company's chief executive officer

24
25

recently declared personal bankruptcy?
A.

Yes.
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1

Q.

That the company's chief executive

2

officer had recently been adjudged to have violated

3

federal securities law?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q-

Would the failure to make disclosure of

6

that information that you've just cited as material,

7

would that be a material omission under both state and

8

federal law?

9

A.

Yes.

Failure to make any one of those

10

disclosures to any one investor would be a material

11

omission or a material misstatement under both federal

12

and state securities laws.

13

Q.

Under the Utah Uniform Securities Act?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Could you just briefly explain for the

16

jury, in general terms, the purpose of securities

17

registration under both state and federal law?

18

A.

Yes.

To reiterate what I said before, a

19

company is asking people for their money, and the

20

company is promising

21

And so the law wants to make sure that because people

22

can't touch, feel, try on, the piece of paper, that

23

that the company explain what its all about to

24

investors.

25

law is tough on disclosure because these people are

in return some piece of paper.

And the law makes it -- it is tough.
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ADDENDUM H
Defendant's Requested Instruction
for Employing an Unregistered Agent

INSTRUCTION NO.

In the Jury Instruction concerning the "EMPLOYING AN
UNREGISTERED AGENT", as alleged in Count Twenty-Eight (28) of
the Amended Information the following change should be made in
the wording of the instruction:
3. Employed Steven Rick Jensen as his Agent

W

00374

INSTRUCTION NO.

In the Statefs proposed Jury Instruction concerning the
"EMPLOYING AN UNREGISTERED AGENT", as alleged in Count Twenty
Nine of the Amendedlnformation the following change should be
made in the wording of the instruction:
3. Employed Steven Bowers as his Agent

V

r
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ADDENDUM I
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 14,

27,

40,

41

INSTRUCTION NO.

In order for you to find the Defendant, John B. Tenney, guilty
of the crime "OFFERING OR SELLING UNREGISTERED SECURITIES", as
alleged in Count One (1) of the Amended Information, you must find
from the evidence all of the following elements of the crime:
1.

At sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, in the State of
Utah, John B. Tenney;

2.

Willfully;

3.

Offered or sold any security;

4.

To Gerald Berg;

5.

When the securities were not registered with the Utah
Division of Securities;

6.

And, if the Defendant has asserted that the securities
were exempt from registration, that an exemption from
registration was unavailable.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find the Defendant guilty as to Count One (1) of the
Information.

If you believe that the evidence has failed to

establish one or more of the above elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not guilty of
the crime charged in Count One (1).

00700

INSTRUCTION NO.

tf

Before you can find the Defendant, John B. Tenney, guilty of
the crime of "SECURITIES FRAUD" as alleged in Count Fourteen (14)
of the Amended Information, you must find from the evidence all of
the following elements of the crime:
1.

At sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, in the State of
Utah, John B. Tenney, directly or indirectly;

2.

In connection with the offer or sale of any security;

3.

To Gerald Berg;

4.

Willfully;

5.

Either
a),

employed a device, scheme, or artifice to

defraud, OR
b).

I
made an untrue statement of a material fact or

omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, OR
c).

engaged in an act, practice, or course of business

which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements of the crime of securities fraud, beyond
a reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty find the Defendant guilty
as to Count Fourteen (14) of the Information.

On the other hand,

00713

if the evidence has failed to establish one or more of the above
elements of the offense charged, it shall be your duty to find the
Defendant not guilty of the crime charged in Count Fourteen (14).

INSTRUCTION NO.

7^

In order for you to find the Defendantf John B, Tenney, guilty
of the crime "UNREGISTERED SECURITIES BROKER OR SALES AGENT", as
alleged in Count Twenty-seven (27) of the Amended Information, you
must find from the evidence all of the following elements of the
crime:
1.

Sometime subsequent to April 27, 1987, John B. Tenney;

2.

Transacted business in the State of Utah as a brokerdealer or agent by;

3-

Willfully;

4.

Offering or selling any security;

5.

To any one or more of the following individuals: Gerald
Berg, Jeffrey Stout, David Baker, John Cawley, Ronald
Frost, David Ingraham, Kristy and Phillip Holmes, Dale
and Shirley Panting, Jeffrey Ulibarri, Richard Ulibarri,
Rocky Ulibarri, James Zieglowsky, or Marlene Peterson;

6.

When John B. Tenney was not registered as a broker-dealer
or agent with the Utah Division of Securities;

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find the Defendant guilty as to Count Twenty-seven
(27) of the Information*

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one or more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the Defendant not

00739

guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-seven (27).
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INSTRUCTION NO.

In order for you to find the defendant, John B. Tenney, guilty
of the crime of "EMPLOYING AN UNREGISTERED AGENT", as alleged in
Count Twenty-eight (28) of the Amended Information, you must find
from the evidence all of the following elements of the crime:
1.

Sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, in the State of
Utah, John B. Tenney, a broker-dealer or issuer:

2.

Willfully;

3.

Employed Steven Rick Jensen;

4.

To offer or sell any security;

5.

To Jeffrey Stout, Jeffrey, Richard and Rocky Ulibarri, or
Kristy and Phillip Holmes;

6.

When Steven Rick Jensen was not licensed as an agent with
the Utah Division of Securities,

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find the defendant guilty as to Count Twenty-eight
(28) of the Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one or more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-eight (28) .

00741

ADDENDUM J
Colloquy

1

there are a number of questions, Mr. Tenney, I would like

2

to put to you.

3

by a prior judge, but since I am going to be the judge

4

that is ultimately responsible for this case, I need to

5

satisfy myself regarding your choice to represent yourself

6

in this matter.

7

Maybe these questions have been put to you

And I will simply start, Mr. Tenney, by asking

8

you is it still your desire to continue to represent

9

yourself in this matter, sir?

10

MR. TENNEY:

Yes, it is, Your Honor.

11

THE COURT:

Now, Mr. Tenney, I am curious

12

as to what your educational level is.

13
14

MR. TENNEY:

business administration.

15
16

THE COURT:

And what year did you obtain that

degree?

17
18

I have a master's degree in

MR. TENNEY:

1968. About 30 years in the

business world.

19

THE COURT:

And have you on any prior occasions,

20

Mr. Tenney, represented yourself in any other criminal

21

matters?

22

discover any prior record, but to try to determine what

23

kind of experience you have in the criminal justice

24

system.

25

And I ask you that question not to try to

MR. TENNEY:

I have not represented myself in

02234

1

any criminal case.

This is the first criminal charge I

2

have ever had, but I did represent myself in the civil

3

case involving the Federal Securities & Exchange

4

Commission.

5

Washington office, D.C.

6

I have also represented myself currently appearing

7

pro se, and I just argued an oral argument before

8

the Court of Appeals in the State of Idaho, which

9

will be ruled on shortly.

The attorneys were brought in from the

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. TENNEY:

12

THE COURT:

I represented myself there.

That is civil or criminal.
These are both civil matters.
Mr. Tenney, do you understand the

13

difference between the civil process and the criminal

14

process, sir?

15

MR. TENNEY:

I believe I do.

I am certainly not

16

an expert in the law, but I believe I understand the basic

17

difference, I guess.

18

THE COURT:

One of the concerns the Court has,

19

Mr. Tenney, is that it sounds as if based upon your

20

education and experience, it would appear to me you

21

certainly have the ability and capability, in all

22

likelihood, to master the facts.

23

that I have, Mr. Tenney, is even though you may have the

24

ability to understand and master the facts, presenting

25

those facts consistent with the rules of procedure and

But one of the concerns
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1

rules of evidence is something very different and

2

something which usually requires not only that one have

3

the training of legal education, but also having the

4

benefit and experience of practicing in the area of

5

criminal law to be informed and knowledgeable regarding

6

the rules of evidence as it relates to criminal law

7

issues, as well as the rules of criminal procedure. Those

8

are the kinds of concerns that I have regarding your

9

ability to adequately represent yourself.

Why is it you

10

believe you are going to be able to master those rules

11

in order to be able to present your defense in this

12

case?

13

MR. TENNEY:

Well, with all due respect, Your

14

Honor, I believe that I am the most qualified person in my

15

case to do this.

16

I have studied them extensively.

17

in this case Candice Johnson of the Legal Defenders

18

Office.

19

ramifications of the rules of evidence, however I am a

20 I

very quick study.

21

I do understand securities laws because
I have as my assistant

I will admit I don't understand all the legal

I do learn and remember fairly well.

In this case, as I understand it, there is a lot

22 I

difference between this and a civil case.

23

of my own briefs and my own preparation.

24 J

amount of paperwork.

25

criminal case.

I have done all
Tremendous

Not as much paperwork as in a

I have had a year basically to work with

1

witnesses.

2

very well and I believe that I can also bring in witnesses

3

that will help me establish that I have not acted with any

4

criminal intent.

5

scienter."

6

have a problem with it.

7

I think I can argue both the facts of the law

What is called the "security law

And I really don't think that I am going to

I talked to Ms. Johnson about this and there

8

really isn't anyone who has the extensive securitiy

9

background that I do.

One of the problems in securities

10

law, particularly as it relates to fraud, is that it is a

11

very vague and fairly indefinable area.

12

black and white as say some other kinds of criminal law

13

might be.

14

argue a case like this without the extensive knowledge

15

of the facts.

16

It is not in

And I believe that it is very difficult to

I know we have knowledge of the facts of

17

securities, but I have far more knowledge of the facts of

18

this case, and I really don't believe that I am going to

19

have any problem with it.

20

their case beyond any reasonable doubt, and I believe I am

21

not over-matched in this case because I come into court

22

with a great deal of facts and the law on my side.

23

THE COURT:

And the State has to establish

And the record my reflect as well

24

that Ms. Candice Johnson from the Legal Defenders

25

Association, I believe, was appointed at the circuit court
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level, not appointed to represent Mr. Tenney but
appointed to assist him in representing himself, and she
is in fact present in the courtroom at this time.
Mr. Tenney, very briefly, in your own order,
what is your understanding of the burden of proof of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt?
MR. TENNEY:

I believe that the State has to

prove beyond any reasonable doubt that, first of all, I
violated the facts of the law, the statutory law that
required registration of my stock.

I believe that the

essence of this case starts with the registration or the
exemption of my stock from registration.

I believe that

that is where it starts.
THE COURT:
moment.

Let me then interrupt you for a

Mr. Tenney, I don't want you to give me a

recitation of the facts.

I am just asking you what

is your general understanding of the burden of proof
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt?
mean to you?

What does that

What is your understanding?

MR. TENNEY:

It means two things to me. It

means that the State has to establish the facts of the
case that I violated a statutory law, specifically
securities fraud.

Secondly, I believe the State has to

establish beyond any reasonable doubt that I acted with
scienter or criminal intent.

There are a number of court

02238

1

cases on that that set out the guidelines and standards

2

which the State must prove in order for me to even be shown

3J

guilty of acting in a criminal fashion.

4

THE COURT:

Now, Mr. Tenneyf do you also

5

understand that, of course, if you were qualified to

6

have a lawyer appointed to represented you, that this

7

Court would be more than willing to appoint a lawyer

8I

to represent you in this case?

9 1

MR. TENNEY:

10 I
11

I do.

I do understand that,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

And finally, Mr. Tenney, regarding

12

this particular issue, do you understand the serious

13

nature of the charges you are facing and, in fact, Mr.

14

Tenney, that there is a reasonable likelihood that if you

15

are convicted of these offenses, these offenses being

16

felony offenses, and the State can correct me, I believe

17

them to be third degree felony offenses.

18

third degree felony is punishable by zero to five years at

19

the Utah State Prison.

20 I

additionally there is also, Mr. Tenney that the sentences

21

on the individual counts, this of course is assuming the

22

jury had found you guilty, there is the potential of a

23

consecutive sentencing as well.

24

think we are talking about approximately a 29-count

25

Information.

Of course, a

There is also a fine up to $5,000,

And needless to say, I

You start running something like that

02239

consecutive, it is basically five times 29. This is a
serious situation, not to even mention the potential
orders of restitution.
Do you truly appreciate and understand the
serious nature of these charges, Mr. Tenney?
MR. TENNEY:

Probably better than anyone in

the courtroom, Your Honor.

I have been completely

unwilling to settle this case on any terms because
I am innocent.
My understanding, if I am not mistaken, is that
under the current law the fines actually could total
$10,000 per charge, not $5,000, under the current law.
A few years ago it was $5,000. Years ago I understand it
was zero to three.

Now I understand it is zero to five

and, if I am not mistaken, there is a total of 32 counts
times five.

I calculate it is 160 years if served

consecutively, and it is a total of $3,200,000 in fines,
if I am not mistaken, under the current law.

The law

that was in existence at the time of these alleged
infractions.
THE COURT:

Mr. Sonnenreich, is there something

you wanted to add, sir?
MR. SONNENREICH:

Yes, Your Honor.

I just

wanted to clarify for the record that, of course,
Mr. Tenney would be subject only to the penalties

02240

l|

only in effect at the time of the alleged offenses,

2

and at that time it was a zero to three undesignated

3

felony.

4

undesignated felony that never quite tracked.

5

similar to a third degree felony, but it is actually

6

a person could possibly do zero to three years,

7

with somewhat a higher crime potential.

8

For some reason it has always been an

MR. TENNEY:

9

irrelevant.

It is

Be that as it may, it is somewhat

I am going to turn 53 in two months and

LO

whether it be 99 years or 160 years, I couldn't possibly

LI

live the sentence.

L2

THE COURT:

The point I am getting at, Mr.

L3

Tenney, is that you do understand the serious nature of

L4

the charges that you are facing?

L5

MR. TENNEY:

L6

THE COURT:

I do.
And with all of that, it is still

L7

your desire to represent yourself in this matter,

18

Mr. Tenney?

19

MR. TENNEY:

20

THE COURT:

Absolutely.
Now, Mr. Tenney, do I also

21

understand from a response that you gave me a moment ago,

22

that there is no possibility whatsoever, other than the

23

State outright dismissing the charges in the Information,

24

25

I

that you are willing to enter into any type of plea
agreement whatsoever?

Is that a fair statement of your

JLV

position?
MR. TENNEY:

Not completely.

I believe, Judge

Medley, you may have also inherited a case from Judge
Sawaya that is a civil case that has never been dismissed
on the very same facts of this matter.
THE COURT:

Let me just —

I apologize for

interrupting you, Mr. Tenney, but I would just like for
you to know that I am not aware of any civil case. I have
not reviewed a civil case.

I know nothing about that

whatsoever.
MR. TENNEY:

It is approximately three-and- a

half to four years old.

It is a civil case filed by

the State on the same —

very same facts.

THE COURT:

What does that have to do with

this criminal matter?
MR. TENNEY:

It is virtually the same

information, the same facts. The criminal case, as I
understand it, is based upon this same evidence that
the State had for the civil case. A civil case was
originally filed and then at a later date, a year ago,
a criminal case was filed on essentially the same
issues.
I am willing to — I have even offered to the
State to stipulate in the civil case, but the State seems
determined to go forward with a criminal charge. I

X1

I
ij

believe this is properly a matter for the civil courts,

2I

not the criminal courts anyway.

3

I would be willing to settle on the civil but not on

4

the criminal.

5
6

But be that as it may,

I am not guilty of criminal activity.

THE COURT:

Mr. Sonnenreich, what were you

going to say?

7

MR. SONNENREICH:

I do believe, Your Honor, as a

8

matter of record, that the civil case was dismissed in

9

1991.

10

MR. TENNEY:

LI

MR. SONNENREICH:

12

I am completely unaware of that.
I just wanted to say, that is

our response.

13

MR. TENNEY:

14

would like to know —

15

THE COURT:

If that is true, Your Honor, I

That is fine.

Whether it was or

16

whether it was not, I don't think is crucial at this

17

point.

18

for calendaring purposes as to where we are headed on this

19

case, if this case is a definite go or whether or not

20 J

there is the potential that this case is going to be

21

resolved in some manner.

22 J

to you.

23

What I am trying to determine, obviously, solely

THE COURT:

That is why I put that question

The record should reflect that based

24 1

on Mr. Tenney's responses, at this time the Court is

251

satisfied that Mr. Tenney understands the serious nature

uzzrt

i I

of the c h a r g e s t h a t h e is f a c i n g .

2 I

substantial base of knowledge and experience as it relates

31

to securities, and since this Court can't order Mr. Tenney

4I

to have a lawyer to represent him, we have no choice

5J

this Court has no choice but to allow Mr. Tenney to go

6I

forward and pro se representing himself.

7

Tenney, it would be my advice to you that you should

8

really have a lawyer to represent you on this case, but

9

you don't want to follow that advice do you, sir?

10

MR. TENNEY:

11
!

H e a p p e a r s to h a v e a

—

Even though, Mr.

I don't, Your Honor, with all due

respect.
I

12

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Tenney.

You may be

13

seated, sir.

14

give you an opportunity to make some comments regarding

15

the motion that you have filed.

16

that I have had a chance to read through the motion. I

17

have not had a full opportunity to compare the cites to

18

the Rules of Evidence regarding hearsay rules and

19

regarding authentication.

20

compare those rules to the exhibits that you are asking

21

the Court to receive, but I would like to give you a

22

brief opportunity, counsel, to make your position

23

at this time.

24

2J

5 J

I would like to go to the State now and just

MR. SONNENREICH:

And let me say to you

I haven't had a chance to

Thank you, Your Honor.

There

are a number of matters that I would like to address today
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ADDENDUM K
I n s t r u c t i o n Nos.

41, 42,

45

INSTRUCTION NO.

//

In order for you to find the defendant, John B. Tenney, guilty
of the crime of "EMPLOYING AN UNREGISTERED AGENT19, as alleged in
Count Twenty-eight (28) of the Amended Information, you must find
from the evidence all of the following elements of the crime:
1.

Sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, in the State of
Utah, John B. Tenney, a broker-dealer or issuer:

2.

Willfully;

3.

Employed Steven Rick Jensen;

4.

To offer or sell any security;

5.

To Jeffrey Stout, Jeffrey, Richard and Rocky Ulibarri, or
Kristy and Phillip Holmes;

6.

When Steven Rick Jensen was not licensed as an agent with
the Utah Division of Securities.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find the defendant guilty as to Count Twenty-eight
(28) of the Information.

If you believe that the evidence has

failed to establish one or more of the above elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to find the defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in Count Twenty-eight (28) .

00741

INSTRUCTION NO.

In order for you to find the defendant, John B. Tenney, guilty
of the crime of "EMPLOYING AN UNREGISTERED AGENT", as alleged in
Count Twenty-nine (29) of the Amended Information, you must find
from the evidence all of the following elements of the crime:
1.

Sometime subsequent to April 17, 1987, in the State of
Utah, John B. Tenney, a broker-dealer or issuer:

2.

Willfully;

3.

Employed Steven Bowers;

4.

To offer or sell any security;

5.

To Gerald Berg;

6.

When Steven Bowers was not licensed as an agent with the
Utah Division of Securities.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and every
one of the above elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall be
your duty to find the defendant guilty as to Count Twenty-nine (29)
of the Information. If you believe that the evidence has failed to
establish one or more of the above elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, it shall be your duty to find the defendant not guilty of
the crime charged in Count Twenty-nine (29) •

00742

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are instructed that the term "agent", for purposes of
Utah's securities laws, means any individual other than a brokerdealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or
attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities.
You are further instructed that the term "broker-dealer", for
purposes of Utah's securities laws, means any person engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others or for his own account.
The term "issuer" means any person who issues or proposes to
issue any security or has outstanding a security that it has
issued.

00*7 4K

ADDENDUM L
Instruction No. 52

INSTRUCTION NO-

^

You are instructed that the Defendant is responsible for any
statements made on his behalf by his authorized salesmen or agents
in connection with any offer or sale of securities.

In other

words, if you find from the evidence that such a salesman or agent
made statements to potential investors and that the Defendant
authorized those statements, then under the law the Defendant is
responsible for the making of those statements as if he had made
them himself.
Similarly, if any authorized agent omitted to state a material
fact, in connection with the offer or sale of a security, and the
Defendant or the agent

had a duty to disclose the fact, and you

find that the Defendant did not inform the agent of the omitted
fact, or did not take sufficient steps to ensure that investors
would

be

informed

of

the

material

fact,

the

Defendant

is

responsible for the omission of the fact as if he himself had
omitted it.

C0753

ADDENDUM M
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 4 8 , 65

INSTRUCTION NO.

HP

You are instructed that while a number of misrepresentations
and

omissions

are

alleged

as

the basis

for

the

charges

of

securities fraud, it is not incumbent upon the state to prove each
and every one of them.

It is enough that the state prove to your

satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to each
individual count of securities fraud, that a false statement or
material omission was made in connection with that count. Further,
it is not necessary that all of the securities fraud counts have
the same material misrepresentation or omission.

Each count may

have a different, or the same misrepresentation or omission.
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INSTRUCTION NO. Y
When you retire to deliberate, you should appoint one of your
number as foreman, who will preside over your deliberations. Your
verdict must be in writing, signed by your foreman, and when found
must be returned by you into court.
In this case, it requires a unanimous agreement of all the
jurors to find a verdict.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

1

of

the

Amended

Information:

Offering

or

Selling

Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

2

of

the

Amended

Information:

Offering

or

Selling

Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

3

of

the

Amended

Information:

Offering

or

Selling

Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

4

of

the

Amended

Information:

Offering

or

Selling

Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

5

of

the

Amended

Information:

Offering

or

Selling

Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

6

of

the

Amended

Information:

Offering

or

Selling
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Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

7

of

the

Amended

Information:

Offering

or

Selling

Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

8

of

the

Amended

Information:

Offering

or

Selling

Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

9

of

the

Amended

Information:

Offering

or

Selling

Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

10

of

the

Amended

Information:

Offering

or

Selling

Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

11

of

the

Amended

Information:

Offering

or

Selling

Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

12

of

the

Amended

Information:

Offering

or

Selling

Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

13

of

the

Amended

Information:

Offering

or

Selling

Unregistered Securities, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count 14 of the Amended Information:

Securities Fraud, a felony;
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or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count 15 of the Amended Information:

Securities Fraud, a felony;

or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count 16 of the Amended Information:

Securities Fraud, a felony;

or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count 17 of the Amended Information:

Securities Fraud, a felony;

or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count 18 of the Amended Information:

Securities Fraud, a felony;

or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count 19 of the Amended Information:

Securities Fraud, a felony;

or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count 20 of the Amended Information:

Securities Fraud, a felony;

or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count 21 of the Amended Information:

Securities Fraud, a felony;

or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count 22 of the Amended Information:

Securities Fraud, a felony;
r\ p ^ <n -Q

or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count 23 of the Amended Information:

Securities Fraud, a felony;

or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count 24 of the Amended Information:

Securities Fraud, a felony;

or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count 25 of the Amended Information:

Securities Fraud, a felony;

or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count 26 of the Amended Information:

Securities Fraud, a felony;

or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count 27 of the Amended

Information:

Unregistered Securities

Broker-Dealer or Sales Agent, a felony; or you may find him not
guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

28 of the Amended

Information:

Employing

Unregistered

Agents, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
You may find the Defendant guilty of the offense alleged in
Count

29 of the Amended

Information:

Employing

Unregistered

Agents, a felony; or you may find him not guilty.
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Verdict forms have been prepared and will be given to you when
you retire to deliberate.

Your verdict should be a result of your

deliberations.
You may find the Defendant guilty of all twenty-nine counts
alleged in the Amended Information, or you may find him not guilty
of

any

of

the

twenty-nine

counts

alleged

in

the

Amended

Information, or you may find him guilty of some, but not all, of
the twenty-nine counts alleged in the Amended Information.
Dated this

day of May, 1993.,

'<-/-7?
TYRONE E. MEDLEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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ADDENDUM N
Frampton Colloquy

FRAMPTON COLLOQUY
1.

Have you ever studied law?

2.

Have you ever represented yourself or any other

defendant in a criminal action?
3.

You realize, do you not, that you are charged with

these crimes:

(Here state the crimes with which the defendant is

charged.)
4.

You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty

of the crime charged in Count I, the court • . . could sentence you
to as much as
$

?

years in prison and fine you as much as
(Then ask him a similar question with respect to each

other crime with which he may be charged in the indictment or
information.)
5.

You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty

of more than one of those crimes this court can order that the
sentences be served consecutively, that is, one after another?
6.

You realize, do you not, that if you represent

yourself, you are on your own?

I cannot tell you how you should try

your case or even advise you as to how to try your case.
7.

Are you familiar with the . . . Rules of Evidence?

8.

You realize, do you not, that the . . . Rules of

Evidence govern what evidence may or may not be introduced at trial
and, in representing yourself, you must abide by those rules?
9.
Procedure?

Are you familiar with the . . . Rules of Criminal

10.

You realize, do you not, that those rules govern the

way in which a criminal action is tried in . . . court?
11.

You realize, do you not, that if you decide to take

the witness stand, you must present your testimony by asking
questions of yourself?
story.

You cannot just take the stand and tell your

You must proceed question by question through your testimony.
12.

(Then say to the defendant something to this effect):

I must advise you that in my opinion you would be far better
defended by a trained lawyer than you can be by yourself.
it is unwise of you to try to represent yourself.
familiar with the law.

I think

You are not

You are not familiar with court procedure.

You are not familiar with the Rules of Evidence.

I would strongly

urge you not to try to represent yourself.
13.

Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer if

you are found guilty and in light of all the difficulties of
representing yourself, is it still your desire to represent yourself
and to give up your right to be represented by a lawyer?
14.

Is your decision entirely voluntary on your part?

15.

If the answers to the two preceding questions are in

the affirmative, you should then say something to the following
effect:

"I find that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily

waived his right to counsel.

I will therefore permit him to

represent himself."
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16.

You should consider the appointment of standby counsel

to assist the defendant and to replace him if the court should
determine during trial that the defendant can no longer be permitted
to represent himself.
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